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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation is a standard econometric research on the scale 
economies of public transport in Hong Kong.  The techniques used 
are Translog Production Equation and Cobb-Douglas Production 
Function. The data used are verifiable official data and statistics that 
span from 1950 to 2009, which have been published but have never 
been used by researchers. 
 
The originality of this work lies in applying advanced production 
functions to data that have a span of almost 60 years.  It is far more 
advanced and accurate than the pioneering attempt of my senior Ms. 
Sara Yang (Yang 2009).  It is also novel by being informed by the 
Coasian thinking of the Department economists Prof. K W Chau, Prof. 
Lawrence Lai, Dr. K C Wong, Dr. Edward Yiu and Dr. Kelvin Wong. 
 
The theme of this dissertation originates from Coase’s (1937) 
work which identifies the objective and existence of a firm and 
explains that firms exist since they can avoid the transaction costs of 
individual production. This comparative advantage of a firm expands 
with its size, thereby leading to mergers and expansions. However, 
this additional advantage of firm expansion soon diminishes as 
decreasing returns to scale comes in. The determination of this scale 
  ix
impact, as a matter of ‘resource allocation’, constitutes my current 
study of bus operations. 
 
This dissertation aims to investigate the economic analysis of 
scale economies and apply them to the regime of public transportation. 
It covers several topics, and is informed by Coasian economic concept. 
This dissertation can be divided into two parts: the first part discusses 
the franchising framework of bus operation in Hong Kong, and 
identifies the rationale behind granting franchises in accordance with 
Coase’s idea (1959) of monopoly formation. The second part 
investigates the scale effect of different local bus companies, given 
that the production scale is a function of overhead costs and 
management fees. It evaluates the attempts of the two largest bus 
companies in Hong Kong to achieve economies of scale. The third 
part evaluates the impacts of conglomerate activities. This looks at 
whether when a bus company becomes conglomerated will affect the 
efficiency of resource allocation. 
 
Besides economic theories, this dissertation also discusses the 
current town planning issues in Hong Kong, with special attention to 
transport planning. It looks into the transport planning of new towns, 
and how they affect the operation of bus companies. The influence of 
the Mass Transit Railway (MTR) in the provision of bus services is 
also discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is well known in the world that Hong Kong possesses a 
sophisticated transport system. In the urban area of Hong Kong, 
3,400,000 people are settled in 70 sq. km. of land (HKSAR 2009: 
266). Such a high density of living generates a huge demand for 
public transport. Everyday, the public transport sector (including 
the buses and railway) carries 11,273,000 passenger-journeys, 
representing 90% of total journeys travelled by locals (Table 2.1, 
Transport Department, Jan. 2010). Our transportation system 
therefore constitutes an important component of our lives, and 
plays the backbone for all economic activities of Hong Kong. 
 
To ensure efficient and high-quality public transport services, 
an efficient use of resources and a clear institutional framework is 
important. These analyses fall under topics of property rights and 
institutional arrangements formulated in Coasian Economies. The 
allocation of resources can be evaluated by the scale benefits 
perceived by public transit companies. This determines whether 
these companies are managing well to utilize their resources; and 
whether it is financially viable for them to expand their operations. 
The fact that public transport facilities act as a form of public 
utilities also calls upon discussions of externality. 
 
In Hong Kong, railways and franchised buses act as two major 
modes of transport, accounting for 35% and 34% of total journeys 
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respectively (HKSAR 2009: 478). Studies of the Hong Kong 
railway sector have been carried out comprehensively in the past, 
both on the topics of patronage (Cheung et al. (2010)) and 
transit-oriented developments (TODs) (Chiang et al. (2004); 
Cervero, et al (2009)). Therefore, this study focuses on the less 
researched bus sector of Hong Kong. 
 
Background 
The earliest operation of public buses in Hong Kong can be 
dated back to 1921, when the Vehicles and Traffic Regulation 
Ordinance was amended to regulate Omnibuses (Leeds 1986: 22). 
Since then, bus services have developed rapidly. In the early days, 
the Government was supportive towards bus operations. Implicit 
contract items were offered by the Government in maintaining 
socially optimal services. These included private treaty grants 
(PTG) of land for depots and reserving sites for bus termini. The 
rationale behind such initiatives can be explained by Coase (1946) 
regarding marginal pricing and externality problems in achieving 
socially efficient productions. Starting from the 1970s, different 
events arose in the transport sector. Some of them affected the 
operation of bus companies, including the grant of cross-harbour 
routes in 1972 and the operation of the Mass Transit Railway 
(MTR) in 1979. All these constitute interesting topics for further 
studies. 
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Research Context 
As an original empirical contribution to transport studies, this 
dissertation examines if and to what extent the business strategies 
of local bus companies overcome the problems of marginal pricing 
in line with Coase’s (1946) solution by achieving economies of 
scale. In the past, many researchers have carried out detailed 
analyses on the operating conditions of public transport companies 
throughout the world. However, until now, none of them deal with 
the situation in Hong Kong, though our transport system here is 
renowned over the world for its high efficiency. Also, many local 
studies in the transport field, such as Wong (1995) and Tong (1997), 
are narrowed towards the policy side, which mainly state current 
policies and give sole descriptions of their impacts. Few of them 
look into the origin of these policies. This dissertation therefore 
supplements their studies by elaborating the policies in accordance 
with neo-classical economic theories, in a property rights and 
institutional approach. This dissertation also aims to supplement 
the gap of study areas and provide a comprehensive study of the 
transport sector in Hong Kong. 
 
This dissertation also investigates to what extent bus 
companies benefit from their production scale, and evaluates their 
effectiveness. The two biggest companies in Hong Kong, the 
Kowloon Motor Bus (KMB) and the China Motor Bus (CMB) are 
chosen for further analysis. The current intention of the 
Government on town planning, which largely affects the operating 
conditions of bus companies, is discussed as well. This includes 
various protective measures granted to the railways instead of 
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buses. More than that, this dissertation also shows the objective 
behind franchising, in addition to the common thoughts as a 
‘revenue reaping’ mechanism to the Government. 
 
Therefore, three aspects of neo-classical economics are 
stressed here: Franchising, Social benefits and Scale economies. 
All of these topics are based on the Coasian theories in welfare 
economics. This dissertation also considers theories in a practical 
side by looking at the real life scenario of Hong Kong. 
 
The first attempt at Coasian studies in local transport was 
performed in Yang (2009). This dissertation differs from it by 
adopting a more comprehensive analysis. First of all, a more 
realistic and commonly-used ‘translog’ production function is used. 
Various costs (Fuel, Labour and Capital) are separately analysed, 
which offers opportunities for in-depth investigation into each 
factor of production. It also studies the cost effect of different 
events encountered by bus companies. 
 
This study aims to achieve the following objectives: 
 
1. Adopting Coasian theories to explain the phenomenon of bus 
operation in Hong Kong. 
2. Developing a comprehensive insight into transport policies in a 
Coasian perceptive. 
3. Evaluating in detail the operation of bus companies in Hong 
Kong. 
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4. Serving as a pioneer research to explore and initiate studies 
over local transport companies using a translog production 
model. 
5. Investigating the current transport planning in Hong Kong and 
discussing their impacts. 
6. Constituting a foundation for future researches on Coasian 
Economies in the public transport sector. 
 
Organization 
With reference to Turabian (2007), this dissertation is 
structured according to Chicago Style. It contains 7 chapters: 
Chapter 1 is the Introduction, which gives the aims and 
backgrounds of this study; Chapter 2 is the Literature Review, 
which looks into papers relating to this field. Definitions and 
relevant laws are also included; Chapter 3 considers the 
Hypotheses; Chapter 4 describes the Methodology; Chapter 5 gives 
the Empirical Findings; Chapter 6 gives a discussion of the results, 
and finally Chapter 7 gives the conclusion and limitations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE & HISTORIC REVIEW 
 
This chapter reviews the key definitions, the theories of Ronald 
Coase, ideas on franchising, research on economies of scale, and 
production models used in transport economic analysis, the 
concepts of franchising informed by Coasian concepts.  This 
followed by a historic review of the bus industry in Hong Kong 
informed by economic theories. 
 
Definitions 
This part elucidates the definitions of two key concepts in this 
paper, franchising and economies of scale to set the context for 
further discussions in later chapters. 
 
Franchising 
The term ‘franchise’ is used to describe a price-mediated 
exchange for an exclusive right of a particular activity (Mathewson 
and Winter 1985: 2). The International Franchise Association, the 
oldest franchise-granting organization in the world, defines 
franchising as a “continuing relationship in which the franchisor 
provides a licensed privilege to do business, plus assistance in 
organizing, training, merchandising, and management”. 
 
Between private parties, a franchisee pays a certain sum of 
money for a right to market a product, (Rubin 1978: 3). In a 
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franchise for public services, a contract is made between a public 
(the franchiser) and a private body (the franchisee) (Nijkamp and 
Rienstra 1995: 2). Under institutional economics, it can be 
regarded as a hybrid between a firm and a market (Rubin 1978: 10). 
A typical franchise contract involves a transfer of an exclusive 
right and a fee (the so called ‘royalties’) (Mathewson and Winter 
1985: 3), which helps raise capital for the franchisor (Rubin 1978: 
4). One famous example is the grant of radio licences, which has 
been widely elaborated in Coase (1959). Details of this regulatory 
framework are discussed in later chapters of this dissertation. 
 
Economies of scale 
Topic of ‘Economies of scale’ (or ‘scale economics’) has 
accumulated rich studies in applied economics. In general, this 
term can be defined as a situation in which “a product is made 
more profitable by manufacturing it in larger quantities so that 
each unit costs less to make” (Collin 2006: 59). In other words, it 
refers to a situation when the average cost of production decreases 
with an increasing scale of a firm. This explains a widely 
acknowledged phenomenon that larger organizations or countries 
can produce goods or services at lower unit price than the smaller 
ones. A contradiction to this term is ‘diseconomies of scale’, in 
which average production cost is boosted when production 
increases (Collin 2006: 53). This may be one result from 
over-expansion of a firm, as suggested in Coase (1937). Studies of 
this aspect are mainly dedicated to identifying the optimal scale of 
firms. Examples include Berechman (1983); Lee and Steedman 
(1970); and de Borger (1984). 
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This concept of scale economies can be illustrated by the 
diagram below: 
 
Figure 2.1 Scale effects of a production firm 
 
Therefore, to determine whether a manufacturer faces positive 
or negative scale economies, it is important to derive a cost 
function and calculate the slope of the Average Cost curve at a 
specific production scale, or in mathematical terms, Q
AC
δ
δ
. 
 
E 
Q 
P /$ 
Marginal Cost 
(MC) 
Optimal 
Production scale
Falling AC with scale 
(Positive economies of scale) 
Rising AC with scale 
(Negative economies of scale) 
Average Cost 
(AC) 
(Production scale) 
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A re-visit into Coasian theories 
This section covers the economic ideas of Coase. Here, we 
limit our focus to the following concepts: public utilities, 
franchising and scale benefits. 
 
Provision of public utilities 
Discussions regarding public utilities have been carried out 
widely in the field of welfare economics. One famous paper is 
Coase (1946), which states a situation that: 
 
“when average costs are decreasing, marginal costs are less than 
average costs, the total amount paid for the product will fall 
short of total costs” (Coase 1946: 169) 
 
This outlines the common problem for public utilities. In such 
goods, there exists a divergence between average cost and 
marginal cost (Coase 1946: 174). If firms follow the traditional 
approach of marginal cost pricing, which is a situation under free 
competition, they may be unable to recover their full costs of 
production (Havlik 1938: 92; Coase 1946: 174). However, if full 
costs are charged, the fee would be too high and deter the public 
from using the utilities (Coase 1946: 182). In other words, without 
market intervention, the possible revenue obtained from a 
customer will be less than the relevant cost. The paper explains this 
production problem with Hotelling’s example of a bridge. It 
mentioned that the production cost of each consumer unit should 
account for the cost for the carrier, which is far more than the cost 
of serving an additional customer (Coase 1946: 171). 
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This divergence between average cost and marginal cost is 
more obvious in the sub-urban (or less-populated) towns. In those 
districts, the usage of services is less frequent than that in the urban 
district. However, as a public body which caters for social benefits, 
their needs for services should not be ignored (Coase 1946: 178). 
One example of these services is public transport. In this case, 
there will be a greater need for institutional support or market 
intervention by the Government. 
 
The above concept of public utility is often used in the topics 
of road pricing, which aims to charge users according to individual 
demands. In our case, however, we are more interested in its 
implication: the need for ‘external’ support. In the paper, Coase 
suggested several solutions. One of them suggests that the 
Government should enter and take the responsibility to provide 
public services for the sake of public interest. This is expressed as 
follows: 
 
“The effect would be for consumers to pay for the cost of the 
product at the central market and for the Government, or rather 
the taxpayer, to bear the costs of carriage.” (Coase 1946: 171) 
 
Another suggestion to this problem is to grant subsidies 
(Havlik 1938: 93; Coase 1946: 172, 174). That is, the Government 
provides financial incentives for producers upon the provision of 
socially sufficient services. In this case, the Government bears part 
of the production cost to ensure sufficient services (Coase 1946: 
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176). 
 
The third suggestion is to adopt a multi-part pricing system, 
(Coase 1946: 180), which is a form of price discrimination derived 
from Monopoly (Button and Drexler 2005: 3). In such systems, the 
average revenue incurred from consumers is set to cover the 
average cost sufficiently. This leads to the occurrence of franchise 
(which is adopted in the public transport of Hong Kong), as a form 
of monopoly power (Caves and Murphy 1976: 8). 
 
Lai et al (2008) also mentioned this market problem arising 
from marginal pricing of public utilities in an unregulated market. 
It demonstrates this scenario with the use of lighthouses. If 
lighthouse operators charge their services at marginal cost, which 
is a situation under free and unregulated market, the revenue it 
received (which is close to zero) will be too low to compensate for 
the long-term expenses for providing the services. (Samuelson 
1964: 151; Coase 1974: 359; Lai et al. 2008: 404, 566) In other 
words, there exists an imbalance between the revenue and the 
actual running expenditure of services. To ensure the safety of 
ships and an adequate provision of lightings, Government 
intervention (such as subsidies) or some levels of monopoly (such 
as licensing) is therefore suggested (Lai et al. 2008: 567, 569). The 
latter approach permits operators to charge at reasonable prices or 
exhibits price discrimination (Lai et al. 2008: 577). This allows 
operating costs to be recovered by the receipts. This concept can be 
equally applied to other public utilities as well, such as public 
transportation. 
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Leeds (1986) observed this situation in the bus services of 
Hong Kong. In certain remote routes, a lower ridership is expected. 
There may incur a high imbalance between possible revenue and 
cost (Leeds 1986: 24). Historically, the Colonial Government 
adopted regulatory terms, cross-subsidization and certain implicit 
agreements to alleviate this problem. Details of this will be 
mentioned in later chapters. 
 
Franchising as regulatory power 
Besides provision of socially optimal services, franchising also 
serves as a regulatory mechanism. This proposition was described 
in Coase (1959). In the paper, Coase investigated the origin and 
effects of such a grant with respect to the radio broadcasting 
industry. At that time, the industry was regulated by the ‘Federal 
Communications Commission’ (FCC). An initial idea of 
franchising was to regulate the radio traffic and prohibit any 
interference of emergency channels (Coase 1959: 25). But it soon 
developed as a form of regulatory power upon the industry. This is 
addressed as follows: 
 
“The Commission was authorized to issue a license if the ‘public 
interest, necessity or convenience would be served’” 
(Coase 1959: 6) 
 
In the Coase (1959) case of broadcasting, when a broadcasting 
company renewed its licence, the Commission would see whether 
public interest was considered. This was to ensure that the 
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licensee’s act was according to a publicly accepted standard 
drafted by a licensing body (Coase 1959: 8). Also, in the franchise 
terms, broadcasting companies were restricted from transferring or 
selling their licence (Coase 1959: 7). These restrictions are similar 
to the franchise terms for bus companies in Hong Kong. (c16, 
Licence of CMB 1933; c17, Licence of KMB 1933) 
 
The need for Government intervention upon public services is 
further supplemented in Coase (1974). It suggested that an 
anti-social situation would result from an unregulated provision of 
public services. It is stated in his paper that: 
 
“Producers often exercise monopolistic power and, in any case, 
without some form of government intervention, would not act in a 
way which promotes the public interest” (Coase 1974: 2) 
 
Pigou (1932) also formulated similar concepts for Government 
intervention in welfare goods. It stated that it was “worthwhile for 
the government to subsidize or tax private activities whenever the 
market produces too little of a good thing or too much of a bad 
thing.”  
 
Similar analysis on the need for Government intervention is 
also discussed in Coase (1960) under topics of social cost. 
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Economies of scale 
The next Coasian theme of this dissertation regards optimal 
production scale, which is originated from Coase (1937). In the 
paper which addressed the formation of firms, Coase stated that 
firms arised so long as the production cost faced by self-employed 
individuals through single contracts was high (Coase 1937: 392). 
Several economic researches extract this idea to argue for the 
tendency towards ‘outsourcing’ (due to the high cost of 
employment contracts). Our study is not devoted to this topic of 
sub-contracting, but its associated idea of firm scale. The paper 
subsequently suggested that the size of a firm is closely related to 
the associated production cost, which is extracted as follows: 
 
“The actual point where the expansion of the firm ceases might be 
determined by a combination of factors mentioned above” 
(Coase 1937: 395) 
 
In the paper, the ‘factors mentioned above’ referred to the 
organization cost and negotiation cost. These include costs of 
employing various factor inputs. Several preceding literatures 
identify these costs as production costs and transaction costs faced 
by an entrepreneur (Rubin 1973: 937; Klein 1999: 21). 
 
Situations of ‘negative returns to scale’ are also discussed in 
the paper. It identifies this situation as a result from over-expansion 
of firms. This point was raised with a famous question, 
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“If by organizing one can eliminate certain costs and in fact 
reduce the cost of production, are there any market transactions 
at all? Why is not all production carried on by one big firm?” 
(Coase 1937: 394) 
 
The above question limits the maximum production size of a 
firm. Expansion beyond this limit increases the average production 
costs (or can be regarded as over-expansion). It states that if firms 
increase their sizes continuously, they may place themselves into a 
stage of “decreasing returns to the entrepreneur function” (Coase 
1937: 394). This criterion of diminishing benefit to scale is 
described as ‘diseconomies of scale’ in later literatures. 
 
As discussed in Coase (1937), the problem of ‘diseconomies 
of scale’ is more likely to occur in a conglomerate firm, one which 
incorporates different kinds of production (Coase 1937: 397). In 
this case, the entrepreneurs have to place more efforts in allocating 
the production factors to a best use, which boost the organization 
and management cost. The risk of a loss incurred from 
mismanagement also increases. This extent of raising the 
production cost, according to the same paper, is closely related to 
the dissimilarity of transactions (Coase 1937: 397). This may be an 
explanation for the trend to fragmentation in US conglomerate 
firms to specialize their individual productions in the 1980s, and a 
reason to limiting product diversifications, as suggested in Bhide 
(1990). 
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As regards the optimal size of firms, Coase (1937) suggested 
that this should be determined by the cost of an additional 
transaction and the scale benefit it achieves (Coase 1937: 395). 
Beyond that point, negative scale return arises, which discourages 
further expansion. This gives rise to subsequent quantitative 
analysis of scale economics. 
 
In-depth analyses in economies of scale have been formulated 
in different industries. In public transport sector, for example, Lee 
and Steedman (1970); and Obeng (1985), revealed that small bus 
companies in the U.K. suffered from negative scale economies in 
their operations. These findings provide supports to the widespread 
trend of conglomeration in the UK bus industry to reduce cost 
(Viton 1981: 301). This dissertation applies similar analysis to 
Hong Kong, and looks into the operating status of two large 
companies, China Motor Bus (CMB) and Kowloon Motor Bus 
(KMB). 
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Production models in transport economics 
In applied economics, there exist numerous functions to 
represent the production of a public transport company. The results 
can serve as indicators to show the operating performance of that 
firm, which facilitate in-depth analyses for researchers and 
policy-makers. In transport studies, considerations are usually 
focused on consumer pricing and service efficiency, and are 
collectively regarded under the scope of ‘transport modelling’. 
Listed below are three commonly used models, as described in 
Díaz (1982): 
 
Cobb-Douglas function 
Cobb-Douglas Model is one of the earliest production models 
formulated in economies (Dreze et al 1966: 1). This model was 
initiated in Wicksell (1895), which stated that the production curve 
is a function of labour and capital (Wood 1994: 179). This was 
further elaborated and applied in Cobb (1928) to investigate 
marginal productivity of distribution (Bronfenbrenner and Douglas 
1939: 8). A typical form of this production function is given below: 
 
βα LKAQ ⋅⋅= , 
where: Q is the output; K is capital; L is labour; A,α, β are 
constants 
 
Detailed analysis on its usage can be referred to in 
Bronfenbrenner and Douglas (1939); and Simon and Levy (1963). 
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Translog Production Equation 
Translog Production Equation is one modified form of the 
Cobb-Douglas function (Hensher and Button 2000: 326). The term 
‘translog’ suggests that the function is ‘transcendental logarithmic’ 
in nature. Some literatures, for example, Hensher and Button 
(2000), may classify this equation under the category of 
Cobb-Douglas Equations. Translog function was developed based 
on a limitation of the Cobb-Douglas Function, that the ‘elasticity 
of substitution between factors of production’ is assumed unity 
(i.e.σ= 11) (Viton 1981: 3), which is rarely seen in transport 
operations (de Borger 1984: 11). In transport studies, the translog 
production function is the most commonly used model to estimate 
the scale effects (Hensher and Button 2000: 330). Mathematical 
details regarding this model will be discussed in later chapters. 
 
Examples of its applications include Viton (1981); Obeng 
(1985); and Filippini and Prioni (2003). 
 
Constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function 
The CES production function was derived in Minhas et al. 
(1961). This model was built to overcome the limitation of 
‘constant input coefficient’ in the Leontief Production Function (i.e. 
perfect complements for input) and ‘unitary elasticity of 
substitution’ in the Cobb-Douglas function (Minhas et al. 1961: 2). 
As the name implies, this function assumes a constant elasticity of 
                                                 
1. This can be shown by the following: 
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substitution. 
 
The general expression of this function takes the following form: 
11
1
1 −−
=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⋅⋅= ∑ s
s
s
s
i
n
i
si XaFQ  
where Q = Output 
F = Factor productivity 
a = Share parameter 
Xi = Individual Production factors 
s = Elasticity of substitution. 
 
Other ‘flexible’ models 
Apart from the above commonly-used production models, 
some researchers also develop their own models to suit specific 
scenarios (Hensher and Button 2000: 326). Most of them, for 
example, the generalized Leontief function in Diewert (1971); the 
generalized quadratic function in Denny (1974); and the 
generalized McFadden functions in Kumbhakar (1990), are built 
on the three ‘basic’ models listed above. These modified 
functions are also known as ‘Flexible functions’ in applied 
economies (Tae 1979: 382). Details of each method are not the 
theme of this dissertation, and therefore will not be discussed here. 
A list of economic models adopted in different transport studies is 
included in the Appendix 1. 
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Bus Industry in Hong Kong: 
An Historic Review 
In Hong Kong, bus operation was regulated under franchise 
agreements. The history of regulating of the bus companies can be 
traced back to 1921, when an amendment was made to the Vehicles 
and Traffic Regulation Ordinance to grant “exclusive rights for 
running a motor bus service in Kowloon and New Kowloon” 
(Leeds 1986: 24). In 1931, a Committee was further appointed to 
regulate the territorial road transport. 2  Later, the Government 
intended to reduce the number of bus companies (from six to two) 
operating in Hong Kong for better regulation (Davis 1994: 1). This 
subsequently led to an open-tender for bus services in September 
1932, and the first franchise was granted to Kowloon Motor Bus 
Company (for Kowloon and the New Territories routes) and China 
Motor Bus (for Hong Kong Island routes). 
 
The initial franchise was granted for a period of 15 years (up 
to 11th June 1948). But bus services were unfortunately halted 
under the Japanese Occupation from 1941 to 1945. Therefore, a 
provisional licence was supplemented to both companies for 
temporary services during 15th February 1946 and 15th August 
1946 (later extended to 15th August 1947). Since then, 15-year 
licences were granted to both bus companies until 1975, when a 
new ‘Public Omnibus Services Ordinance’ was passed. This 
ordinance restricted each franchise period to 10 years. 
 
Since the 1990s, there were wide public discontent regarding 
                                                 
2. Appendix F, Tender Notice for Road Passenger Transport (1931), p.46 
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the services of CMB, especially for its aged bus fleet and high 
break-down rates (Wong 2001: 20). Similar opinions were also 
addressed in the Legislative Council Meetings as follows: 
 
“… The past of China Motor Bus Company is a good example. 
Since the company was awarded a franchise, no improvement of 
service was seen. It is gratifying that the Government opens up 
26 routes this year to introduce competition to bus services.” 
(Adapted from LEGCO Minutes on 22 October 1992) 
  
As a result, in 1993, the Government took away 26 routes 
from CMB and awarded them to City-bus (CTB) for a trial term of 
3 years, aiming to force CMB to improve its services. (CTB was a 
formerly non-franchised bus company in Hong Kong). However, 
the services provided by CMB were still not satisfactory (LEGCO 
Minutes, 18 June 1997). In June 1997, the Government decided not 
to extend the franchise of CMB. Its 88 routes were awarded to a 
new bus operator, the New World First Bus (NWFB). 
 
NWFB was initially a co-owned company of ‘New World 
Development Company Limited’ (74%) and the First Group from 
the UK (26%). In March 1998, it was granted a 5-year licence to 
operate 88 ex-CMB routes commencing from September 1998. In 
2000, New World Development acquired all the shares of NWFB. 
In 2003, both NWFB and CTB became subsidiary companies 
under Chow Tai Fook Enterprises and NWS Holdings Ltd. Since 
then, bus operation on Hong Kong Island was monopolized by one 
single enterprise. 
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Other franchise bus companies in Hong Kong include the 
Long Win Bus Company Limited (LWB) and the New Lantao Bus 
Company Limited (NLB). The former one (LWB) is a full 
subsidiary of KMB, and was licensed in 1996 to run part of the 
Airport and Tung Chung routes. The latter one (NLB) is 
responsible for bus services on Lantau Island (plus a cross-border 
route B2). 
 
A summary of the franchise periods for the four major bus 
companies in Hong Kong (ex-CMB, KMB, CTB and NWFB) is 
shown as follows: 
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Table 2.1  Franchise Periods of Bus Companies 
Bus Company Year of Franchise Commenced (Period) 
CMB 1947 (10 years) (later extended 2 years) 
1959 (15 years) (later extended 1 year) 
1975 (10 years) 
1985 (4 years) 
1989 (4 years) 
1993 (2 years) 
1995 (3 years3) 
KMB4 1947 (10 years) (later extended 2 years) 
1959 (15 years) (later extended 1 year) 
1975 (10 years) 
1985 (10 years) (later extended 2 years) 
1997 (10 years) 
2007 (10 years) 
CTB 
(Franchise 15) 
1991 (3 years6) (later extended 2 years) 
1993 (3 years7) 
1996 (10 years) 
2006 (10 years) 
NWFB 1998 (5 years) 
2003 (10 years) 
 
A Coasian perspective in bus franchise of Hong Kong 
Since 1933, the franchise arrangements for regulating buses in 
Hong Kong display various possible applications of Coasian 
theories, especially in welfare economics. In the aspect of public 
interest, the initiation of a franchise creates a monopoly initiative 
for operators to provide socially sufficient transport services 
                                                 
3 The franchise of CMB was terminated in 31st August, 1998. 
4 The franchise of LWB is not included here 
5 Franchise 1 for CTB refers to bus operations of urban routes (North Lantau & Airport routes: 
Franchise 2) 
6 This franchise was granted in 1991 to operate an ex-CMB route, 12A 
7 This franchise was granted in 1992 to operate 26 ex-CMB routes 
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(Button 2005: 393). In previous chapters, it mentioned a 
divergence between average and marginal production costs exist 
for public utilities. This leads to potential problems of marginal 
pricing, and eventually causes under-supply of services under free 
market conditions (Coase 1946: 180). This point of securing 
socially sufficient transport services through franchising in Hong 
Kong is also mentioned in Leeds (1986)8 and Wong (2001)9. This 
situation was coherent with the example of lighthouses, in which 
trinity houses were licensed to provide lighting services (Lai et al. 
2008: 410). 
 
As for the nature of the governing documents, it is not difficult 
to identify similarities between the Broadcasting example in Coase 
(1959) and our bus scenario. Both cases adopted franchising to 
safeguard public interest; both situations involved a competitive 
bidding process, in which rights was allocated to the highest bidder, 
(Coase 1959: 15; Tender Notice for bus Services 1933: 47); and 
both made strict restrictions upon the transfer of licence (Coase 
1959: 22; c16, Licence of CMB 1933; c17, Licence of KMB 1933). 
In Coase’s case, the property granted was a right to use the 
formerly public radio channels for public broadcasting. In our case, 
this right can be interpreted as the right to use public roads for 
public transport services. 
 
In Economics, discussions of franchising mainly falls under 
two aspects: 1) profit-seeking initiatives; and 2) social governance 
                                                 
8 See P.24, Leeds (1986) 
9 See P.8, Wong (2001) 
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(Rubin 1978; Mathewson 1985). Some literatures, for example, 
Eisenberg (1982) and Romano (1985), suggested that franchise 
revenue (or so called ‘royalties’) constituted a major objective of 
franchising. These revenues can therefore be used in public 
financing. For example, Eisenberg (1982) mentioned that 
“franchise taxes may be a highly significant proportion of 
revenue” (Eisenberg 1982: 188-189; see also Romano 1985: 231). 
Hazlett (1998) also suggested that franchising “produces a great 
deal of revenue that could be used to subsidize public service 
programming” (Hazlett 1998: 540). 
 
In the case of the Hong Kong bus industries, the objective of 
franchising as a major source of income is not expressly mentioned 
by the Government. But in reality, both KMB and CMB were 
required under franchise terms to pay periodic sums (known as 
‘royalty’) as follows: 
 
‘The Licensee shall pay to the Colonial Treasurer on the seventh 
day of each and every month in respect of the preceding month of 
this licence, including each and every month of any and every 
extension thereof (if any), the following royalty or percentages on 
such gross annual receipts of the Licensee” 
(s.9 of the CMB Licence 1933, s.8 of the KMB Licence 1933) 
 
Leeds (1986) also revealed that royalty payments by transport 
companies did reap a considerable amount of revenue for the 
Public Account in the past years. It mentioned that, 
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“Royalties were a common feature of the taxation system in Hong 
Kong. Right from the early days there had been vigorous 
resistance to any form of direct taxation and to raise revenue 
Government found it easier, both from the point of view of public 
opinion and administrative cost, to obtain a substantial part of 
its revenue from the sale of licences and monopolies” (Leeds 
1986: 25-26) 
 
The handsome sum of royalties is also displayed in the 
Government Accounts. From the period 1934 to 1939, the actual 
receipts even out-perform the initial estimation (A1-3, Hong Kong 
Administrative Report, 1934–1939). The table below shows the 
amount of royalties received during the early periods: 
 
Table 2.2  Royalties paid by bus companies, 1934 - 1939 
Year 
CMB 
(% Total government 
revenue) 
KMB 
(% Total government 
revenue) 
1934 $101,510 
(0.343%) 
$128,094 
( 0.433 %) 
1935 $118,275 
( 0.416 %) 
$117,505 
( 0.413 %) 
1936 $124,088 
( 0.413 %) 
$116,613 
(0.388%) 
1937 $128,708 
( 0.388 %) 
$140,991 
( 0.425 %) 
1938 $194,703 
( 0.530 %) 
$225,672 
( 0.614 %) 
1939 $257,874 
( 0.622 %) 
$382,282 
( 0.922 %) 
(Source: Section A1(3), Hong Kong Administrative Report, 
1934-1939) 
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The original bus licence also incorporated other profit-seeking 
terms for the Colonial Government. One example is the restriction 
that every bus operated by the companies has to be manufactured 
by British companies. (s.4, CMB Licence 1933; s.3, KMB Licence 
1933) These ‘market-protection’ tactics over domestic products 
constituted profit-seeking opportunities for the British 
Government. 
 
The second aspect of franchising to promote regulatory power 
was, according to the Government, the main objective of 
franchising, (Leeds 1986: 24; Davis 1995: 1). This idea initiated in 
the 1920s when wide public dissatisfaction over bus services was 
expressed in Davis (1995). Various literatures also suggested that 
the original thoughts of the Government was “to secure better 
services for the public”, which ensured that satisfactory services 
were provided (Leeds 1986: 24). This rationale of public benefit is 
similar to the ‘FCC’ example illustrated in Coase (1959), in which 
the Government’s objective was to ensure that ‘public interest, 
necessity or convenience would be served’ (Coase 1959: 6). 
 
In both licences for CMB and KMB, fares and routes were 
clearly defined in schedule-A. This was an attempt to serve two 
objectives: First, it prevents the over-charging problem (charging 
above the socially optimal level), which may arise from the 
market-failure situation under a monopoly regime (Coase 1974: 2). 
Second, it attempted to use the profitable urban routes to 
cross-subsidize the less profitable rural routes. In rural routes, the 
usual ridership may not be enough to cover the operating cost. 
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Therefore, without some kind of regulation or subsidies, these 
routes “probably would not be served under free competition” 
(Leeds 1986: 24). Or in some cases, the fare charged would be too 
high to be borne by the public. This problem is addressed in Coase 
(1946) as follows: 
 
“Consumers who live in regions of low density of population 
would probably not be willing to pay the total costs of supply of 
public utility services which in their case would be very high, 
and … they would not be given the services” (Coase 1946: 11) 
 
The above argument constitutes the major reason for the 
Government to adopt a ‘tied’ mechanism in granting several (rather 
than individual) bus routes. This also ensures “a reasonable and 
acceptable price” was charged to the pubic (Cheng 1984: 31) for 
transport services and secures socially-sufficient public transport 
services in the less dense districts. (Leeds 1986: 24). 
 
However, one problem of granting a franchise, according to 
Coase, was the monopolistic nature of the franchisee. It was 
pointed out in Coase (1974) that firms operating under a monopoly 
condition usually ignore quality issues and neglect social needs 
(Coase 1974: 2; see also Ch.2). This contradicts the basic objective 
of the Government to safeguard the interest of the general public 
(Coase 1959: 21) 
 
To deal with this problem of market-failure, in both franchise 
documents for CMB and KMB in 1933, detailed conditions of bus 
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services, for example, frequency and bus types, were listed in the 
Schedule A of the Franchise Agreement for CMB and KMB. The 
Governor was also empowered to inspect the transport activities by 
the two companies. (s.10, Licence of CMB 1933; s.9, Licence of 
KMB 1933) 
 
Since the enactment of franchise conditions in early 1933, the 
franchise terms have been constantly modified in different periods 
to meet social objectives. One notable example was the change 
from regional franchise to route franchise in 1975. This offered a 
chance for the Government to introduce competitors more easily 
(Wong 2001: 86), and thus exerted more precise controls. All these 
ensured that the basic public interest was served and prevented 
quality issues arising from monopolies. This also gave rise to the 
introduction of CTB in later years. 
 
 A brief history of ordinances governing bus operations in 
Hong Kong is shown in Appendix 2. 
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The Mass Transit Railway (MTR) 
Details regarding MTR operation are not the main theme of 
this dissertation. However, it affects heavily the bus operations and 
the land-use development in Hong Kong. 
 
The history of MTR in Hong Kong dates back to 1965. At that 
time, the Colonial Government published a report ‘Hong Kong 
passenger transport survey’, which suggested the use of rail 
transport. This led to the setting up of the MTR Corporation 
(MTRC) in 1975. In early days, the MTRC was a 
Government-owned body. However, in 2000, it was privatized as a 
listed company. In 2007, MTRC merged with KCRC as the sole 
railway operator in Hong Kong. 
 
Since its operation, MTR has been a keen competitor against 
buses. This is exaggerated by the town planning prospect of Hong 
Kong, where most of the development is concentrated in small 
urban districts. The routes of the MTR go along the busiest areas 
of Hong Kong (see Appendix 5), which comprise the major 
demand for public transport. Because of high usage, these services 
enjoyed low average cost (shared by passengers) (Coase 1946: 
178). This generates a keen completion in the most ‘profitable’ 
routes which were formerly monopolized by bus companies. Some 
bus routes, for example, the North-Island routes and the Nathan 
Road routes, even run in parallel with the MTR after the 
commencement of MTR. 
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Over the past years, the Government has offered a number of 
protective mechanisms and financial initiatives for the MTR to 
improve its services and encourage capital investment. The most 
significant aspect is the development rights above their stations, 
which now occupies a major portion (66.9% in 200910) of their 
profits. In 2009, the MTRC catered for 39.4% of total public 
transport journeys in Hong Kong (Transport Dept. Jan. 2010: s5), 
which is higher than the sum of all franchised bus companies in 
Hong Kong. 
 
 Route maps of the initial and current MTR system are included 
in Appendix 5. 
                                                 
3. Announcement Report, Annual Results 2009, MTRC, p.25 
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Having studied the franchising framework and the history of 
bus operation with reference to Coasian theories, we develop three 
empirical hypotheses in this dissertation based on Coase’s theories 
of firms and public utilities. In the following session, numerical 
analyses are taken to investigate the performance of the two largest 
bus companies, Kowloon Motor Bus (KMB) and China Motor Bus 
(CMB) in greater detail. The three hypotheses are listed below: 
 
Hypothesis 1 
“Economies of scale can be achieved in the bus operation of Hong 
Kong.” 
 
This hypothesis is developed from the findings of similar 
researches in foreign countries. Obeng (1985) suggested that urban 
bus systems in the US displayed positive economies of scale 
(Obeng 1985: 2). Similar conclusions were also drawn in Viton 
(1981) and Berechman (1983) for Israel. Therefore, in later 
chapters, we will investigate whether this statement is viable in 
Hong Kong. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
“The involvement of real-estate business by bus companies 
generates a negative impact in the allocation of resources.” 
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This hypothesis is based on the assumption in Coase (1937). In 
the paper, it stated that conglomerate firms have a higher tendency 
for mismanagement over individual productions. Later analysis 
will consider whether this prediction takes place in the bus industry 
of Hong Kong, with the use of production models. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
“The impact of MTR poses a positive impact in the production 
efficiency for resource allocation.” 
 
It is widely acknowledged in micro-economics that the 
presence of competition poses efficiency-seeking effects. Firms are 
driven to improve their services (so as to attract more customers) 
and promote better allocation of production resources to deal with 
competition (Gwilliam et al. 1985: 107; Yarrow 1986: 13). The 
applicability of this statement to the Hong Kong Bus Sector will be 
tested in later chapters. 
 
In Hong Kong, the MTR has long been treated as the major 
competitor against buses. This is mainly due to the geographical 
intensity of development.  Also, there is also the belief that after 
MTR starts operation, bus companies can reduce their expenses on 
some routes and concentrate more on providing subsidiary 
transport services, such as the Feeder Bus services (Transport 
Department 1989: s8(4)). 
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Hypothesis 4 
“The presence of other transport modes poses a positive impact in 
the production efficiency.” 
 
This hypothesis is similar to hypothesis 3 regarding the effect of 
competition. Here, two other transport modes, Public Light Buses 
(PLBs) and the Light Rail Transit (LRT) System will be examined. 
 
 
Remarks 
In this dissertation, only the two largest companies in Hong 
Kong, KMB and CMB, are chosen to define our scope of study. 
Operational data for other bus companies (CTB, NWFB and NLB) 
are excluded. However, a table showing the operating information 
of all bus companies is included in Appendix 4 to assist further 
studies. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter explains the choice of economic model, model 
specifications and the key assumptions behind running the model. 
 
Choice of economic model 
In this current study of transport companies, two production 
models, ‘translog’ production model and a more restrictive 
Cobb-Douglas model, are chosen to investigate the operation of 
public transit companies. The previous ‘translog’ model was 
introduced in Christensen et al. (1971), and was initially 
designated for the manufacturing industry. This paper adopts a 
rather ‘localized’ version as described in Berechman (1983) and 
Obeng (1985), which specifically adjust this model to fit in the 
scenario of bus operations. This translog production model has an 
advantage over linear models in Coles and Wabe (1975) and 
traditional Cobb-Douglas models in Williams (1979) in capturing 
cross-substitution effects between different forms of inputs, which 
is usual in the public transport sector (Viton 1981: 288). 
 
In previous chapters, it mentioned various alternate production 
models for scale analysis. However upon further investigations, 
some of them cannot be adopted in this study. One limitation is the 
lack of comprehensive samples we perceive in Hong Kong. Here, 
local transport services have been historically provided by private 
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limited enterprises, which in most cases, will be reluctant to 
disclose their operational details except in annual reports. This 
generates problems in the availability of data compared to other 
cities such as the U.S. and U.K., where public transport is provided 
by public subsidiaries (Coles and Wabe 1975: 128; Williams 1979: 
214). This lack of comprehensive and precise operational data is 
equally faced by public agencies, who expressed their difficulties 
in carrying out transport-policy researches (Smith and associates 
1976: 39). This lack of information prohibits the use of C.E.S. 
production function and the more advanced ‘flexible’ models. 
 
Third, adopting a translog production model offers better 
samples for benchmarking, thus assists future comparisons with 
other countries. As mentioned before, Translog production function 
is widely used for transport analysis, especially in bus-related 
studies (Button and Hensher 2000: 330). Therefore, the result 
generated from this paper can act as a foundation to facilitate 
further studies in scale economics. 
 
 Despite the advantages of the translog model, the major 
limitation of the model is the requirement of large sample size to 
estimate its large number of coefficients. As comprehensive 
operational data was only reported in annual terms, every run of 
this model will inevitability incorporate a long study period. This 
rules out the idea to estimate separate models for shorter periods. 
To deal with this problem, after running the translog model, 
operational data will be extracted and re-processed in a more 
restrictive model. In this new model, all cross-substitution effects 
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were assumed unity (so that it becomes a purely Cobb-Douglas 
model). This model significantly reduces the sample size 
requirement, and allows calculation of scale factors in each 
segment period. 
 
 As mentioned previously, Cobb-Douglas production function 
ignores cross-substitution effects. In this current study, we limit our 
studies to scale-effects and eventual analysis. It can therefore 
reasonably exclude the cross-effects of inputs. 
 
Assumptions in the analysis 
Upon using the translog and Cobb-Douglas model for transport 
studies, we have to make some assumptions as follows: 
 
1. The target company is a ‘pure’ transport company 
This suggests that all the revenues and cost engaged in the 
economic model are fully attributed to transport operation. 
(Berechman 1983: 4; Filippini and Prioni 2003: 3) 
 
2. The amount of services provided by the transport company is 
mainly determined by labour, capital and energy (Obeng 1985: 
2) 
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Model Specification 
Part 1 – The Translog Model 
Based on the assumptions made above, we assume that the 
production is a function of fuel, labour and capital (Berechman 
1983: 10; Obeng 1985: 184), which is shown as follows: 
 
Q = f (k, e, l),                 (1) 
where Q = Output measured in total passenger-journeys 
k = Capital Input 
E = Energy Input 
L = labour Employed 
 
Assume that the total production cost of a public transit 
company is a function of unit input prices and output. We obtain 
the cost function as follows: 
 
C = g (pi, Q),                 (2) 
where C = Total Production Cost 
pi = Unit price of all factor inputs 
Q = Total Unit of Production 
 
Combining Equation (1) and (2), the cost function of a 
transport company can therefore be written as: 
 
C = g (Q, pK, pE, pL),              (3) 
where Q represents the quantity of production; pK, pE, pL 
represents the respective unit cost for capital, fuel and 
workers 
(Obeng 1985:184; Flippini 2003: 686) 
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For the cost variables, it is important to note that all samples in 
the regression model should be deflated to the same price level. 
This is to diminish the effect of changing the aggregate price level 
on the production costs. In this regard, all costs (pK, pE, pL) were 
divided by the GDP deflator (d) to get the real value. 
 
In this study, we aim to investigate the impact of various 
factors in the total cost of production. Therefore, three extra factors, 
‘technology’ (t), ‘competitor’ (M), and ‘Events’ (E) are added to 
the production function. The meanings of these factors are shown 
as follows: 
 
Technology (t) 
This technology indicator is a continuous variable added to 
account for technology advancement throughout the study period. 
As time passes, there should be technology change and invention 
over time, which assist the production of operators. In this current 
study, we assume a constant rate of advancement for simplicity. 
That is, a ‘1’ is added to this variable every year, and ‘0.5’ for 
every half year (Entry for 1950 is taken initially as ‘1’). In some 
studies, such as Berechman (1983) and Obeng (1985), this 
technology factor is missed out. This is probably because of the 
short time intervals of their studies, which assumes negligible 
technology change. As for our case, a long study period is 
incorporated. This variable should not be ignored. 
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Competitor (M) 
The dummy variable ‘Competitor’ (M) is added to represent 
the existence of competitors. Competitors, as mentioned above, 
may boost the production efficiency (reduce production cost) or 
exerts extra production costs to operators. 
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Other variables 
Besides the above variables, various ‘event’ dummies are also 
included in the analysis. This is to assist our study of different 
events mentioned in Ch.3. The variables used in this study will be 
discussed in ‘data description’. 
 
In the translog analysis of Filippini and Prioni (2003), a 
variable ‘ownership’ was incorporated. This is used to study the 
effect of privatization in bus operations. During their study period, 
the target bus companies were re-structured from a Government 
subsidiary to a private enterprise. In our analysis, there are no such 
observations during the study period (1950-2009). All the 
companies remain private limited enterprises throughout the time. 
 
After adjusting the variables in equation (3), we obtain the 
following production function: 
C = g (Q, pK, pE, pL, t, Mi, Ej),          (4) 
where all the variables bear the same meaning as above 
 
Rewriting Equation (4) using the translog production function 
demonstrated in Christensen et al (1971) and Berechman (1983), 
and upon adjustment for dummy variables, the general cost 
function of a public transport company can be shown as: 
 
lnC = α0 + αQ lnQ + αK lnpK + αE lnpE + αL lnPL + αQQ (lnQ)2 / 2 + 
αQK lnQ lnpk + αQE lnQ lnpE + αQL lnQ lnpL + αKK (lnpK)2 / 
2 + αKE lnPK lnpE + αKL lnpK lnpL + αEE (lnpE)2 / 2 + 
αEL lnpE lnpL + αLL (lnpL)2 / 2 + αi Mi + αi Ej              (5) 
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As mentioned above, economies of scale is a measure of scale 
effects in production. It is regarded as the change in average 
production cost with an increase in unit output (Berechman 1983: 
10; Obeng 1983: 186). In mathematics, it can be expressed by 
‘
Q
AC
ln
ln
δ
δ ’. 
 
To include the component of average cost in this model, some 
terms have to be rearranged. It is known that the average cost, AC, 
is defined as total production cost per quantity produced, which is 
written as: 
C = AC x Q 
By taking the logarithm of both sides, we obtain the following 
equation: 
ln C = ln AC + ln Q 
 
Differentiating the above equation with respect to ln Q, we 
obtain: 
1
ln
ln
ln
ln +=
Q
AC
Q
C
δ
δ
δ
δ ; or 
1
ln
ln
ln
ln −=
Q
C
Q
AC
δ
δ
δ
δ                (6) 
 
The term 
Q
C
ln
ln
δ
δ  in the above equation can be obtained by 
differentiating Equation (5), which follows that: 
LQLEQEKQKQQQ pppQQ
C lnlnlnln
ln
ln ⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+= αααααδ
δ
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Substituting the above equation in (6), it gives rise to the 
equation below: 
1lnlnlnln
ln
ln −⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+= LQLEQEKQKQQQ pppQQ
AC αααααδ
δ
 (7) 
The above value,
Q
AC
ln
ln
δ
δ , is also called the cost elasticity of 
output (Berechman 1983: 4), or average cost elasticity (ECS), 
(Obeng 1985: 4). This value of ECS has a strong implication in 
scale economics as shown below: 
 
 
Table 4.1  Implication of ECS 
Value of ECS Implication 
< 0 (Negative) Economies of Scale 
= 0 Constant Returns to Scale 
> 0 (Positive) Diseconomies of Scale 
 
In this model, a number of coefficients are generated. They 
can be used to estimate the factor substitution and factor 
productivity of each input factor (i.e. Energy, Labour and Capital). 
But this is not the main theme of this dissertation and therefore is 
not discussed here. 
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Part 2 – The Cobb Douglas Function 
As mentioned previously, the Cobb-Douglas production 
function is a restricted form of the translog production equation. In 
this dissertation, this function is used to supplement the previous 
translog production model to shorten each period of analysis. This 
allows separate sets of coefficients to be estimated in each period, 
and therefore estimates the extent of scale economies in each 
subsidiary period. 
 
Ignoring all the cross-relationships of inputs in Equation (5) 
above, we rewrite the production equation as follows: 
 
+⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅+= LLEEKKQ pppQTC lnlnlnln)ln( 0 βββββ  
jjiit EMt ⋅+⋅+⋅ βββ ,                    (8) 
where β0, βQ, βK, βE, βL, βt, βi, βj are coefficients to be 
estimated; Q is the output expressed in total 
passenger-journeys; 
pK, pE and pL are respective unit costs for capital, 
energy and labour; t indicates the technology 
advancement; Mi represent competitors; and Ej are 
event dummies. 
 
The definitions of terms in this equation are in line with 
equation (5). And we adopt the same values in part 1 for each 
variable in this current model. 
 
The above Equation (4) is also a typical cost function under 
Cobb-Douglas production model. This logarithmic form is 
generally adopted by researchers to estimate different production 
coefficients. (Wiliams 1979: 215) 
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 Differentiating the equation (4) above with respect to Q, we 
obtain the coefficient βQ. And from Equation (2), we obtain: 
11
ln
ln
ln
ln −=−== QQ
C
Q
ACECS βδ
δ
δ
δ
 
 
The subsequent processing of data is similar to that of the 
translog production model mentioned in part A. 
 
 In this subsequent Cobb-Douglas Model, a time-break was 
inserted in 1972 to split the investigation period, which gives rise 
to two separate models from 1950 to 1998. This is mainly due to 
two reasons. First, the commencement of cross-harbour routes in 
August 1972 marked a new era in the operating environment for 
bus companies. With these new routes granted, both companies 
(CMB and KMB) were able to take in passengers from both sides 
of the harbour. This leads to a substantial change in the service 
network of their bus services. Also, a new operational arrangement 
of bus routes was initiated behind the cross-harbour routes. 
Individual bus companies operated these routes on a joint-mileage 
basis, and reaped their shares of profit. (Annual Report 1973) This 
posed a significant change in the operating tactics of bus 
companies. 
 
Second, splitting the model in 1972 allows more accurate 
estimation in the coefficients. By doing so, our effort in 
determining the coefficient of ‘tunnel’ can be saved, since this 
factor is not our main focus in this dissertation. This increases our 
sample size and hence number of coefficients. 
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Data Description and Processing 
In the following analysis, focus is put onto the two largest bus 
companies, China Motor Bus (CMB) and Kowloon Motor Bus 
(KMB). For each company, variables mentioned in Equation (1) 
were collected. Each of them bears a specific meaning as 
demonstrated in Berechman (1983); Obeng (1985); and Filippini 
and Prioni (2003). These data were then plugged into the ‘translog’ 
production function mentioned in (1) for regression. Details of 
each variable are summarized in table 4.2 below: 
 
Table 4.2  Definitions of each variable in production model 
Variable Abbreviation Description 
Total Cost C - Operating Cost for transport 
Output Q - Passenger-Journeys carried 
Unit Cost of 
Capital 
pK - Cost for land, Spare parts, 
Insurance, Maintenance and other 
intangible assets (per bus) 
Unit Cost of 
Energy 
pE - Fuel, Oil and Petrol Cost (per 
operating kilometre) 
Unit Cost of 
Labour 
pL - Provision for salaries and wages 
and other welfare to staff (per 
employee) 
Competitors M - Effect of competitor 
- Dummy variables (0/1) 
Events E - Effect of Cross-harbour Tunnel 
- Engagement in real estate activities
- Dummy variables (0/1) 
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In the above table, it is important to note that all entries for 
‘costs’ includes only the operating cost, which are essential for 
ordinary transport activities. The amounts for capital investment 
and non-bus operations, for example, advertising and bus hiring 
costs, are excluded from the regression data. 
 
Variable ‘Competition’ and ‘Event’ are dummy variables 
which are given the number 0 or 1. For the variable ‘Competition’ 
(M), it accounts for the occurrence of a competitor. When a new 
competitor is introduced, ‘1’ is given. 
 
In this model, three modes of competitors, the Mass Transit 
Railway (MTR), Public Light Buses (PLBs) and Light Rail Transit 
LRT are included. MTR takes the value ‘1’ since 1979, when the 
modified initial system was opened. PLB takes the value ‘1’ since 
1969, when initial licences were granted to legalize the PLBs in 
Hong Kong (Wong 2001: 19). LRT takes the value ‘1’ since 1989, 
following the commencement of the LRT system in the New 
Territories. 
 
The provision for MTR and PLB was incorporated in both 
production model of KMB and CMB, since actual overlapping of 
services was noted between these transport modes. However, the 
provision for LRT is only included in the model of KMB. This is 
because the service network of LRT is restricted to the 
North-western part of the New Territories, and therefore should 
serve limited influence to CMB in the Hong Kong Island. 
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Variable ‘Event’ is another dummy variable in this model. In 
our current analysis, two factors, ‘TUNNEL’ and ‘DEV’ are 
incorporated in this variable. Variable ‘TUNNEL’ only occurs in 
the more advanced ‘translog’ model. In the revisited Cobb-Douglas 
Model, this variable can be omitted since a time-break is set to 
split the investigation period (see P. 43). This variable takes the 
value of ‘1’ since 1972, when cross-harbour routes were introduced. 
This event placed a high impact in the operating culture of both 
KMB and CMB as mentioned previously, and therefore cannot  
be neglected. 
 
Variable ‘DEV’ accounts for the involvement in real estate 
activities by bus companies. In our case, a direct involvement in 
real estate development activities by that company is counted. That 
is, the company directly undertakes to make decisions on land 
developments not relating to transport operations. Therefore, under 
this definition, earnings through selling land to a third party, or 
indirect participation through equity investment, are not counted. A 
company is given ‘1’ for this variable when it is directly engaged 
with property development projects. This variable represents any 
change in resource allocation upon becoming a conglomerate firm. 
 
For CMB, this value is taken as ‘1’ since 1987. Since that year, 
CMB initiated their real estate business in the redevelopment of 
two sites, IL5532 and IL7178 (later combined as IL8849), in North 
Point as a residential and commercial complex, which were 
formerly used as bus depots. This is stated in the Annual Report as 
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follows: 
 
“The question of redeveloping of Inland Lot 5532 and Inland Lot 
7178 is under active consideration… An application was made 
under Section 16 of the Town Planning Ordinance (Cap.131) to 
the Town Planning Board to redevelop these sites into residential, 
office and retail complexes. The Broad of Directors has not yet 
decided…” 
(Annual Report of CMB 1987: 6) 
 
At present, the site is used as a residential and commercial 
complex, Island Place, which comprises a shopping centre, 
residential units and an office tower. The current situation of this 
site is shown in the photograph below: 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Island Place, an ex-depot of CMB 
(Photograph taken on 30/3/2010) 
 
KMB takes this value ‘1’ under this definition much later, in 
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2003. In that year, the Lai Chi Kok Properties Investment Ltd. 
(LCKPI), a fully-owned subsidiary of KMB Holdings Ltd. was 
founded. The company was to undertake the residential and 
commercial development of the former Lai Chi Kok Depot. Details 
of the project are described in its Annual Report 2003. 
 
“LCKPI, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Group, is the owner of 
the old depot site at Po Lun Street, Lai Chi Kok. The depot 
ceased operations in 2002 and was demolished in the same year. 
The site is being redeveloped into a residential and commercial 
complex with a total gross floor area of about one million square 
feet and a retail podium area of about 50,000 square feet.” 
(Annual Report of KMB 2003: 41) 
 
 At present, the site has been developed as a residential and 
commercial complex, Manhattan Hill. Current status of the site is 
shown in the following photo: 
 
Figure 4.2 The Manhattan Hill, an ex-depot of KMB 
(Photograph taken on 28/3/2010) 
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Lastly, for the deflator used to acquire real prices, GDP 
deflators for the corresponding periods are recorded. In economic 
studies, researchers mainly use GDP deflator and Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) to adjust for price movements. In our case, GDP is 
used as it serves as a more comprehensive indicator for the whole 
economy. 
 
Official accounts for GDP deflator since 1961 was launched 
by the Statistical Department. Before 1961, no such figure is 
officially published to public. However, there exist a brief 
estimation of this deflator based on wage index, fuel index and 
retail price index, by the Government, which could be achieved in 
the public records. These figures were used as deflators over our 
study period. The values of these are attached in Appendix 3. 
 
In this dissertation, operational data for the above entries are 
recorded, from the year 1950 to 2009. For the years 1950 to 1998, 
annual operation statistics are taken. For the years 1998 to 2009, 
semi-annual data are used. This is to provide enough ‘population’ 
for the last 11 years to run a fair translog model (at least 20 sets of 
data are necessary for a sound result). 
 
Data before 1950 are ignored in this current study. This is due 
to the outbreak of the Pacific War, which brought massive 
destruction of Government records. Statistical data on bus 
operations before 1941 were destroyed during the war 
(HKRS170-1-739-1/PRO; Davis 1995: 1). During 1941-1945 of 
the Japanese occupation, bus operations in Hong Kong were halted, 
  - 52 -
and therefore no operational data can be drawn (Davis 1995: 19; 
HKRS170-1-730/PRO; Chan 1999: 19). 
 
 Bus services in Hong Kong resumed, in September 1946 (for 
KMB) and November 1946 (for CMB). However, our first record 
in this study is taken in 1950. This is because bus companies were 
undertaking a revitalization stage from the Second World War 
(WWII) before 1950, in which massive destruction of their fleets 
and assets were caused. This can be shown as follows: 
 
“The Japanese had confiscated almost all the buses and stocks of 
spare parts and few can be traced. … When the relieving forces 
came ashore in 1945 they found little serviceable road transport.” 
(Hong Kong Annual Report, 1946, p. 90) 
 
Similar facts are recorded in Davis (1995). It mentioned that a 
considerable amount of resources had to be spent by both 
companies to resume their services (Davis 1994: 14, 17), which 
boosted the operational cost. Bus services were not rehabilitated 
until 1949 (Ng 1950: 2-14). Therefore, to give a fair result, our 
analysis excludes operational data before 1950. 
 
Besides that, operating statistics for 1967 are rejected as well. 
This is due to the uncertain political condition and massive social 
disorder that occurred throughout that year, which adversely 
affected the provision of public transport (Ng 1968: 87; Chan 1999: 
32). This interruption of services was recorded in offically as 
follows: 
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“The Kowloon Motor Bus Company had to suspend services on 
many routes and carried out a re-examination of the justification 
and requirements of each route before bringing them back into 
operation. … China Motor Bus Company was operating 77 per 
cent of normal services and the Kowloon Motor Bus 75 per cent”  
(Hong Kong Annual Report 1967, p. 190-191) 
 
Similar evidence on the severe impact is also displayed in a 
significant drop in mileage and ridership (shown in Appendix 4) 
during that year. 
 
As regards the ‘cost’ and passengers in the regression model, 
the KMB data includes operating details of both KMB and LWB 
after 1997. In Yang (2009), data for LWB was treated in a separate 
model. However, upon further analysis, it is revealed that LWB 
depends largely on its mother company, KMB, in its operation. 
Many production resources, such as its head office and managers, 
are shared among the two companies (KMB 2000: 58, 94). 
Therefore, identifying LWB as a separate enterprise will produce a 
biased result and underestimate its operating cost. 
 
The collected data are then processed with a statistical 
software ‘E-Views 5.1’. In the program, coefficients are estimated 
using the common ‘Least Square’ method. A ‘best-fit’ line linking 
all the independent variables is estimated upon the running the 
model. 
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Sources of data 
All the data used in this study are first-hand data disclosed by 
the authority or relevant companies. All data on operating costs, 
which include Labour Cost, Capital Cost and Fuel Cost, are 
extracted from two sources. Data from 1950-1975 are adapted 
from original Government documents on the companies’ financial 
accounts, which bus companies are required to disclose 
periodically under section 10 (CMB) or section 9 (KMB) of the 
franchise terms. This information is available at the Hong Kong 
Public Records Office (PRO). Data after 1975 are extracted from 
annual and interim reports published by the relevant companies. 
This is attributed to the confidentiality of these operational data 
until 2013. 
 
Details about the mileage (measured in kilometres) and 
ridership (measured in passenger-journeys) from year 1950 to 1971 
are adapted from the Annual Reports of Hong Kong, and relevant 
traffic statistics obtained from the Transport Department. 
 
 Data on GDP deflator is adapted from two sources. Data after 
1961 can be accessed in annual reports of Hong Kong. Before 
1961, no precise value could be traced. However, there are certain 
estimates that were performed within Government Departments 
based on three indexes, retail price index, wage index and fuel 
index. These unpublished data could be traced from the public 
records. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
Following the methodology mentioned above, we divide our 
timeline into two periods. The first period, 1950 to 1998, adopts 
annual operational information. The more recent set, 1998 to 2009, 
adopts semi-annual data instead. This is due the small sample size 
throughout the last 11 years, which therefore prohibits the use of 
annual operational data. Model 1 to 3 adopts a more advanced 
translog model. Model 4 to 8 are revisited models using a more 
simplified Cobb-Douglas Function, which aims to solve for 
fragmented periods as mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Regression results of each model are shown as follows: 
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Model 1: C.M.B. (1950-1998) (Annual Data used) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(TC)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/04/10   Time: 12:15   
Sample: 1950 1998   
Included observations: 48   
LOG(TC) = C(1) + C(2) * LOG(PASS) + C(3) * LOG(PK) + C(4) * 
LOG(PE) + C(5) * LOG(PL) + C(6) / 2 * 
(LOG(PASS)^2) + C(7) * LOG(PASS) * LOG(PK) + 
C(8) * LOG(PASS) * LOG(PE) + C(9) * LOG(PASS) 
* LOG(PL) + C(10) / 2 * (LOG(PK)^2) + C(11) * 
LOG(PK) * LOG(PE) + C(12) * LOG(PK) * LOG(PL) 
+ C(13) / 2 * (LOG(PE)^2) + C(14) * LOG(PE) * 
LOG(PL) + C(15) / 2 * (LOG(PL)^2) + C(16) * T + 
C(17) * PLB + C(18) * MTR + C(19) * TUNNEL + 
C(20) * DEV 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C(1) -36.05431 24.08015 -1.497263 0.1455
C(2) 0.117261 1.582398 0.074104 0.9415
C(3) 3.595535 1.287568 2.792501 0.0093
C(4) 0.681109 2.870634 0.237268 0.8142
C(5) 4.405939 1.832281 2.404620 0.0230
C(6) 0.212167 0.092744 2.287659 0.0299
C(7) -0.069403 0.055157 -1.258293 0.2187
C(8) 0.144926 0.070291 2.061815 0.0486
C(9) -0.240244 0.097801 -2.456450 0.0205
C(10) -0.013027 0.082413 -0.158075 0.8755
C(11) -0.054616 0.081599 -0.669329 0.5088
C(12) -0.178487 0.108088 -1.651314 0.1098
C(13) -0.572393 0.176202 -3.248512 0.0030
C(14) -0.193620 0.167999 -1.152508 0.2589
C(15) 0.219665 0.156191 1.406391 0.1706
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C(16) 0.016400 0.004335 3.783393 0.0007
C(17) -0.086870 0.048176 -1.803190 0.0821
C(18) -0.011745 0.084027 -0.139777 0.8898
C(19) -0.003739 0.057139 -0.065435 0.9483
C(20) 0.500297 0.115745 3.322396 0.0012
R-squared 0.998138     Mean dependent var 19.47256
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.996875     S.D. dependent var 0.718808
S.E. of 
regression 0.040186     Akaike info criterion -3.296277
Sum squared 
resid 0.045217     Schwarz criterion -2.516610
Log likelihood 99.11065     Durbin-Watson stat 2.065649
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Model 2: K.M.B. (1950-1998) (Annual Data used): 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(TC)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/04/10   Time: 10:43   
Sample: 1950 1998   
Included observations: 48   
LOG(TC) = C(1) + C(2) * LOG(PASS) + C(3) * LOG(PK) + C(4) * 
LOG(PE) + C(5) * LOG(PL) + C(6) / 2 * 
(LOG(PASS)^2) + C(7) * LOG(PASS) * LOG(PK) + 
C(8) * LOG(PASS) * LOG(PE) + C(9) * LOG(PASS) * 
LOG(PL) + C(10) / 2 * (LOG(PK)^2) + C(11) * 
LOG(PK) * LOG(PE) + C(12) * LOG(PK) * LOG(PL) + 
C(13) / 2 * (LOG(PE)^2) + C(14) * LOG(PE) * 
LOG(PL) + C(15) / 2 * (LOG(PL)^2) + C(16) * T + 
C(17) * PLB + C(18) * MTR + C(19) * LRT + C(20) * 
TUNNEL 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) -61.01727 60.46309 -1.009166 0.3215 
C(2) 4.660191 3.392447 1.373696 0.1804 
C(3) -9.168363 3.747882 -2.446279 0.0210 
C(4) 9.737150 3.886473 2.505395 0.0183 
C(5) 13.02052 6.926439 1.879829 0.0706 
C(6) -0.102394 0.101417 -1.009638 0.3213 
C(7) 0.271677 0.067785 4.007927 0.0004 
C(8) -0.228703 0.132027 -1.732242 0.0942 
C(9) -0.442055 0.268043 -1.649197 0.1103 
C(10) 0.189558 0.060949 3.110110 0.0043 
C(11) 0.264292 0.143773 1.838262 0.0767 
C(12) 0.130786 0.234829 0.556944 0.5820 
C(13) -0.335703 0.183732 -1.827129 0.0784 
C(14) -0.670785 0.277516 -2.417101 0.0224 
 
 
 
 
 
  - 59 -
 
 
 
C(15) -0.414770 0.352475 -1.176736 0.2492 
C(16) 0.044582 0.007198 6.193910 0.0000 
C(17) 0.036364 0.099814 0.364315 0.7184 
C(18) -0.067707 0.038208 -1.772067 0.0873 
C(19) 0.000757 0.043930 0.017243 0.9864 
C(20) -0.288593 0.158718 -1.818281 0.0797 
R-squared 0.999092 Mean dependent var 20.71467
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.998475 S.D. dependent var 0.852730
S.E. of 
regression 0.033298 Akaike info criterion -3.672277
Sum squared 
resid 0.031046 Schwarz criterion -2.892610
Log likelihood 108.1346 Durbin-Watson stat 1.762444
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Model 3: K.M.B. (1998-2009) (Semi-Annual Data used): 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(TC)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/04/10   Time: 13:00   
Sample: 1998S1 2009S2   
Included observations: 24   
LOG(TC) = C(1) + C(2) * LOG(PASS) + C(3) * LOG(PK) + C(4) * 
LOG(PE) + C(5) * LOG(PL) + C(6) / 2 * 
(LOG(PASS)^2) + C(7) * LOG(PASS) * LOG(PK) + 
C(8) * LOG(PASS) * LOG(PE) + C(9) * LOG(PASS) * 
LOG(PL) + C(10) / 2 * (LOG(PK)^2) + C(11) * 
LOG(PK) * LOG(PE) + C(12) * LOG(PK) * LOG(PL) + 
C(13) / 2 * (LOG(PE)^2) + C(14) * LOG(PE) * 
LOG(PL) + C(15) / 2 * (LOG(PL)^2) + C(16) * T + 
C(17) * DEV 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) -1626.238 2748.533 -0.591675 0.5727 
C(2) 180.3283 276.9616 0.651095 0.5358 
C(3) 54.70035 69.48603 0.787214 0.4570 
C(4) 3.901664 38.78187 0.100605 0.9227 
C(5) -83.99886 89.01886 -0.943608 0.3768 
C(6) -10.08028 14.05203 -0.717354 0.4964 
C(7) -2.551696 3.993027 -0.639038 0.5431 
C(8) -0.060690 1.907253 -0.031821 0.9755 
C(9) 4.473347 5.388658 0.830141 0.4339 
C(10) 0.144621 1.697873 0.085178 0.9345 
C(11) -0.031761 1.014355 -0.031312 0.9759 
C(12) -0.418260 1.962758 -0.213098 0.8373 
C(13) 0.187947 0.488928 0.384406 0.7121 
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C(14) -0.197588 1.282067 -0.154117 0.8819 
C(15) -0.033088 4.256561 -0.007773 0.9940 
C(16) -0.005667 0.005792 -0.978513 0.3604 
C(17) 0.021794 0.035702 0.610436 0.5609 
R-squared 0.994845 Mean dependent var 21.57983 
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.983061 S.D. dependent var 0.156493 
S.E. of 
regression 0.020368 Akaike info criterion -4.765207 
Sum squared 
resid 0.002904 Schwarz criterion -3.930752 
Log likelihood 74.18249 Durbin-Watson stat 2.374971 
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Model 4: C.M.B. (1950-1971) (Annual Data used): 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(TC)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/04/10   Time: 15:21   
Sample: 1950 1971   
Included observations: 21   
LOG(TC) = C(1) + C(2) * LOG(PASS) + C(3) * LOG(PK) + C(4) * 
LOG(PE) + C(5) * LOG(PL) + C(6) * T + C(7) * PLB 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) -1.981235 1.459359 -1.357606 0.1961 
C(2) 0.664514 0.089680 7.409852 0.0000 
C(3) 0.155617 0.040632 3.829912 0.0018 
C(4) 0.152199 0.064635 2.354745 0.0337 
C(5) 0.587437 0.057127 10.28301 0.0000 
C(6) 0.016008 0.008697 1.840596 0.0870 
C(7) -0.048531 0.044708 -1.085514 0.2960 
R-squared 0.997786 Mean dependent var 18.81145 
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.996838 S.D. dependent var 0.494599 
S.E. of 
regression 0.027813 Akaike info criterion -4.065405 
Sum squared 
resid 0.010830 Schwarz criterion -3.717230 
Log likelihood 49.68675 Durbin-Watson stat 1.074549 
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Model 5: C.M.B. (1972-1998) (Annual Data used): 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(TC)  
Method: Least Squares  
Date: 04/04/10   Time: 16:40  
Sample: 1972 1998  
Included observations: 27  
LOG(TC) = C(1) + C(2) * LOG(PASS) + C(3) * LOG(PK) + C(4) * 
LOG(PE) + C(5) * LOG(PL) + C(6) * T + C(7) * MTR + 
C(8) * DEV 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 1.197842 1.659182 0.721947 0.4791 
C(2) 0.577117 0.052786 10.93321 0.0000 
C(3) 0.064086 0.080883 0.792339 0.4379 
C(4) 0.429451 0.119046 3.607451 0.0019 
C(5) 0.474022 0.067867 6.984609 0.0000 
C(6) 0.030326 0.004905 6.183371 0.0000 
C(7) -0.000183 0.096843 -0.001891 0.9985 
C(8) 0.189790 0.078515 2.417233 0.0259 
R-squared 0.980660 Mean dependent var 19.95906 
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.973535 S.D. dependent var 0.319514 
S.E. of 
regression 0.051979 Akaike info criterion -2.834775 
Sum squared 
resid 0.051334 Schwarz criterion -2.450823 
Log likelihood 46.26946 Durbin-Watson stat 2.210314 
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Model 6: K.M.B. (1950-1971) (Annual Data used) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(TC)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/04/10   Time: 18:53   
Sample: 1950 1971   
Included observations: 21   
LOG(TC) = C(1) + C(2) * LOG(PASS) + C(3) * LOG(PK) + C(4) * 
LOG(PE) + C(5) * LOG(PL) + C(6) * T + C(7) * PLB 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 4.830888 2.320531 2.081803 0.0562 
C(2) 0.445492 0.109598 4.064789 0.0012 
C(3) -0.028787 0.028597 -1.006637 0.3312 
C(4) 0.440462 0.098887 4.454178 0.0005 
C(5) 0.478219 0.073319 6.522476 0.0000 
C(6) 0.047306 0.009922 4.768004 0.0003 
C(7) 0.082324 0.054229 1.518075 0.1513 
R-squared 0.997478 Mean dependent var 19.76840 
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.996398 S.D. dependent var 0.581069 
S.E. of 
regression 0.034875 Akaike info criterion -3.612900 
Sum squared 
resid 0.017028 Schwarz criterion -3.264726 
Log likelihood 44.93545 Durbin-Watson stat 2.647507 
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Model 7: K.M.B. (1972-1998) (Annual Data used): 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(TC)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/04/10   Time: 17:04   
Sample: 1972 1998   
Included observations: 27   
LOG(TC) = C(1) + C(2) * LOG(PASS) + C(3) * LOG(PK) + C(4) * 
LOG(PE) + C(5) * LOG(PL) + C(6) * T + C(7) * MTR + 
C(8) * LRT 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 7.344157 1.828298 4.016937 0.0007 
C(2) 0.206875 0.071607 2.889021 0.0094 
C(3) 0.294998 0.042049 7.015638 0.0000 
C(4) 0.367848 0.093299 3.942667 0.0009 
C(5) 0.293860 0.044568 6.593546 0.0000 
C(6) 0.071963 0.009145 7.868808 0.0000 
C(7) -0.086530 0.035206 -2.457799 0.0238 
C(8) 0.017513 0.035826 0.488843 0.6305 
R-squared 0.996860 Mean dependent var 21.33658
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.995703 S.D. dependent var 0.436024
S.E. of 
regression 0.028581 Akaike info criterion -4.030924
Sum squared 
resid 0.015521 Schwarz criterion -3.646973
Log likelihood 62.41748 Durbin-Watson stat 2.122811
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Model 8: KMB (1998-2009) (Semi-Annual data used): 
 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(TC)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/04/10   Time: 16:15   
Sample: 1998S1 2009S2   
Included observations: 24   
LOG(TC) = C(1) + C(2) * LOG(PASS) + C(3) * LOG(PK) + C(4) * 
LOG(PE) + C(5) * LOG(PL) + C(6) * T + C(7) * DEV 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) -2.277816 3.140122 -0.725391 0.4781 
C(2) 0.741589 0.168458 4.402218 0.0004 
C(3) 0.163235 0.055783 2.926229 0.0094 
C(4) 0.253281 0.039066 6.483386 0.0000 
C(5) 0.591568 0.149183 3.965375 0.0010 
C(6) -0.006899 0.005387 -1.280642 0.2175 
C(7) 0.014225 0.022156 0.642022 0.5294 
R-squared 0.984248 Mean dependent var 21.57983
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.978688 S.D. dependent var 0.156493
S.E. of 
regression 0.022846 Akaike info criterion -4.481605
Sum squared 
resid 0.008873 Schwarz criterion -4.138006
Log likelihood 60.77926 Durbin-Watson stat 2.157230
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Economies of scale analysis 
Based on the above regression results, we calculate the EOS in 
various periods from Equation (3). Results are shown as follows: 
 
Table 5.1  Regression results of ECS 
Model Period Value of ECS 
Estimated 
Bus 
Operator 
Scale 
Economies 
1 1950 – 1998 
(excl. 1967) 
-0.37054 C.M.B. Positive 
2 1950 – 1998 
(excl. 1967) 
-0.45296 K.M.B. Positive 
3 1998 – 2009 -0.56299 K.M.B. Positive 
4 1950 – 1971 
(excl. 1967) 
-0.33549 C.M.B. Positive 
5 1972 – 1998 -0.42288 C.M.B. Positive 
6 1950 – 1971 
(excl. 1967) 
-0.40362 K.M.B. Positive 
7 1972 – 1998 -0.79313 K.M.B. Positive 
8 1998 – 2009 -0.25841 K.M.B. Positive 
 
From table 5.1, it is demonstrated that the two big transport 
companies perceives negative ECS throughout the period, which 
implies positive returns to scale over the focused period. This is 
equally proven by the two production models adopted in this 
investigation. This fulfils the prediction made in Hypothesis 1 
regarding scale economies. 
 
For the aspect of competition, three types of competitors 
(Public light buses, MTR and LRT) are investigated. Their impacts 
are shown in the coefficients for various dummy variables (PLB, 
MTR and LRT). Their impacts in mileage and ridership of buses 
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can also be traced from Appendix 4. 
 
Effect of Public Light Buses (PLBs) 
The effect of PLBs in bus operation is shown by C(17) of 
Model 1 (CMB) and Model 2 (KMB); and restated in C(7) of 
Model 4 (CMB) and Model 6 (KMB). In both Model 1 and Model 
4, negative coefficients are reported in the regression model (see 
C(17) in Model 1; C(7) in Model 4) This shows that the presence 
of PLBs in the Hong Kong Island prompted CMB to allocate its 
resources more efficiently. This satisfies part of the initial 
hypothesis 4 for CMB. 
 
However, for KMB, positive coefficients are reported. It is 
revealed in C(17) of Model 2 and C(7) of Model 4. This suggests 
that the presence of minibuses in Kowloon and the New Territories 
actually boosts the operating cost of KMB. Hypothesis 4 is 
therefore partly refuted. 
 
Effect of the Mass Transit Railway (MTR) 
The cost impact of the MTR in bus operations is demonstrated in 
C(18) of Model 1 (for CMB) and 2 (for KMB). In our current study, 
both models report negative values for this factor. This suggests 
that the presence of the MTR promotes more efficient use of 
production resources for bus companies, which results in a 
cost-reduction effect. This result is also coherent with our findings 
in Model 5 and 7 (see C(7)). This satisfies the initial prediction in 
Hypothesis 3. 
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Effect of the Light Rail Transit (LRT) 
The impact of the LRT in bus operations is demonstrated in 
C(19) of Model 2. This factor is not included in the production 
models of CMB, since the operation of LRT is only limited to the 
North-western part of the New Territories, which should exert 
limited effect on the operation of CMB. In our analysis, a positive 
value is obtained for this variable. The result is supplemented by 
C(8) of Model 7. This suggests that the introduction of LRT 
System in late 1988 actually increased the production cost for bus 
companies. Hypothesis 4 is therefore partly refuted for the case of 
LRT. 
 
Effect of Real estate business 
The result of property development activities in bus operations 
is displayed in C(20) in Model 1 (for CMB) and C(17) in Model 3 
(for KMB). In both cases of CMB and KMB, positive figures are 
recorded in the production models. This results is supplemented in 
C(8) in Model 5 and C(7) in Model 8. This implies that the 
engagement of bus companies in real estate activities has adversely 
affected their managing efficiency of transport operations. This 
eventually boosts up the operating cost of transport. Hypothesis 3 
is therefore certified. 
 
Data on CTB & NWFB 
Analyses on the operation of the CTB and the NWFB were 
excluded in this study. One reason is the short history of these two 
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companies compared to CMB and KMB, which makes it different 
to obtain a continuous set of operational data to represent the 
operating trend. Another reason is the limited availability of 
operational data. To estimate all the coefficients of a legitimate 
‘translog’ production model, at least 20 sets of data (at least 9 years 
with semi-annual data) are required. However, operational 
statistics of these two companies were not fully disclosed by these 
two companies, which are now under a subsidiary of a private 
conglomerate enterprise, thereby prohibiting further investigation. 
More than that, the ownership of these operators kept changing 
over time, and from a specified bus company to subsidiary 
branches of public utilities business. Even so, a summary of the 
available operational data is still included in Appendix 4 for future 
studies. It is shown that both companies (CTB & NWFB) play a 
diminishing role in their bus operations, in terms of mileage and 
their market share. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
This chapter discusses some interesting key results as regards 
the abnormal findings on the impact of the LRT on bus operation; 
the strange divergence in scale economies and ridership; road 
planning, town planning and transport policies. 
 
Impact of the LRT on bus operations 
From the regression model demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, it is shown that the operation of the LRT actually 
increased the operating cost of KMB. This effect is different from 
the other cases of the PLBs (for CMB) and the MTR. One 
explanation for this is the additional restriction imposed on bus 
companies following the commencement of the LRT. In 1988, a 
new legislation, the Amendment of Franchise (Kowloon Motor 
Bus Company) Order, was passed on KMB’s services. The order, 
which was effective since 18th September 1988, curtailed the 
‘internal’ bus services within the North-western part of the New 
Territories as follows: 
 
“…, no bus on any route referred to in the third column of the 
Schedule opposite that day shall within the North-West Transit 
Service Area – 
(a) put down any passenger who has boarded the bus within the 
North-west Transit Service Area; or 
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(b) take up any passenger whose journey is to terminate within the 
North-west Transit Service Area, 
unless permitted by the Commissioner for transport with the 
consent of the Kowloon Canton Railway Corporation, or in an 
emergency” 
(s3, Amendment of Franchise (Kowloon Motor Bus Company) 
Order 1987) 
 
With the enforcement of this amendment, the operating region 
of KMB was further restricted. This may force the company to 
forfeit one particular market and concentrate on other potentially 
costly routes with lower ridership. This may contribute to an 
increasing operating cost for KMB following the operation of the 
LRT system. 
 
Divergence in ECS and Ridership 
Form the above regression result, it is shown that both CMB and 
KMB enjoy positive economies of scale. However, upon further 
investigation, it can be observed that this extent of scale benefit 
actually diminishes since 1970s (i.e. their marginal benefit of 
‘scale production’ diminished). This is shown by a continuous 
reduction in the value of ECS over time. Moreover, the operating 
mileage and ridership perceived by both companies are also 
dropping over time, as shown in Appendix 4. This can be analysed 
from two aspects, road planning and town planning policies, which 
is stated as follows. 
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Road Planning 
The operation of bus services is highly dependent on road 
infrastructure. However, since the late 70s, there have been 
numerous articles regarding the shortage of road infrastructure, 
which fails to cater for the demand of road traffic. This lack of 
road infrastructure affects the ridership and operating costs of the 
bus companies. This impact was first addressed by CMB in 1978 
as follows: 
 
“… whilst mileage operated decreased from 26.2 million to 25.8 
million due, in the main, to the ever worsening traffic conditions. 
Without the congestion, the increase in passengers carried would 
have grown even further.” (Annual Report of CMB 1978, p.9) 
 
KMB also addressed this congestion problem in its Annual 
Report 1979. It mentioned that: 
 
“Traffic Congestion has become a main cause for irregular 
operation and is responsible for mileage and trip loss. … 
Financially, traffic congestion has far-reaching effects; slowing 
down the average speed of buses makes more vehicles necessary 
in order to move a given number of passengers in a specified 
time and consequently additional capital investment and 
operating costs incurred in meeting passenger needs, …” 
(Annual Report of KMB 1979, p.6) 
 
Up to the present, traffic congestion still poses a major 
problem in Hong Kong. Detailed analysis on the economic loss 
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caused by congestion have been widely studied in the academic 
field, such as Hau (1992); and Lam and Tam (2004). For bus 
operators, traffic congestion accounted for 34% of total complaints 
in 2008 (Appendix 4, Transport Complaints Unit Report 2008). 
One explanation for this wide-spread congestion problem regards 
the lack of considerations towards transportation in land-use 
planning, as suggested in Yeh (1996) and Lee (1998). Some 
researchers argue that the current land-use policies are often used 
to promote economic development (Yeh 1996: 1), which causes 
congestion problems on the main roads, (Yeh 1996: 5). One 
obvious example is the Mid-Levels, which is specifically 
addressed by the ‘Office of The Ombudsman’ (OMB) in 2006. 
Details of their jurisdictions are shown below: 
 
“… , the number of residential units in the Mid-Levels has 
continued to grow, particularly during the period from 1985 to 
1996. Eight traffic studies on the Mid-Levels by TD between 1973 
and 2005 showed that the traffic condition had never been 
satisfactory. The Moratorium has clearly failed in its stated 
objective: the continued building developments and 
redevelopments have resulted in a rise in the number of residents 
and volume of traffic in Mid-Levels.” 
(Office of the Ombudsman (2006): 75) 
 
This suggests that the existing road infrastructure is unable to 
cater for the current transport demand derived from its existing 
land-use. 
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Town planning policies on transport 
Another reason that may lead to a back-drop in bus ridership is 
the town planning practices nowadays. In recent years, the 
Government adopted a protective strategy towards railway 
operations, and places an unfair operating environment for buses 
(Lau 1997: 148; 2004: 93). This is more obvious in the planning of 
new towns such as Yuen Long, Tuen Mun and Tseung Kwan O. In 
Tuen Mun, for example, a monopoly operating right is granted to 
the LRT system (Details are mentioned previously). A critical 
analysis in this planning aspect was taken in Lau (1997), on the 
grounds of depriving reasonable transport choice for residents (Lau 
1997: 5). 
 
A similar intention is also observed in Tseung Kwan O. 
Following the commencement of the Tseung Kwan O Extension of 
the MTR, a significant number of bus routes were forced to be 
cancelled to give way to the railways (Lau 2004: 93). This can be 
attributed to the Government’s policy towards MTR as shown 
below: 
 
“The transport strategy is to place emphasis on rail transport and 
the co-ordination of public transport services. Priority will be 
accorded to railways which will form the backbone of our public 
transport system, and their use will be encouraged.” 
(Transport Bureau 2002: 2) 
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Apart from that, the Government’s intention to boost the 
railway sector in public transportation is also mentioned in various 
planning guidelines. One of these earliest papers is the White 
Paper published in 1990, which mentioned priorities for railways 
over buses (Transport Branch of HK 1990: 6). It was later 
accommodated by the subsequent Railway Development Studies 
(RDS) (1993; 1999) and Railway Development Strategies (1994; 
2000). 
 
In the ‘Railway Development Strategy’ published by the 
Government in 1994, it mentioned the use of “route-protection” 
mechanisms to benefit the railways (Transport Branch 1994: 2), 
which restrict the operating environment for buses. This was 
supplemented in its preceding paper in 2000, which aims to boost 
the market share of the rail sector to 43% in 2016 (Transport 
Bureau 2000: 12). The third comprehensive transport studies 
(CTS-3) (1999) also suggested that railways should take over from 
franchised buses and become the backbone of the whole transport 
system (Smith, W. and associates 1999: 4). 
 
 All these expressed the Government’s intention to boost the 
travel demand of railways over buses, and constitutes a 
diminishing operating environment for bus companies nowadays. 
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The following figure shows the proposed railway network of 
Hong Kong in 2016, as suggested in Railway Development 
Strategy 2000 (Transport Bureau 2000: 4). 
Figure 6.1  Proposed railway network in 2016 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation constitutes an original econometric research 
on the scale economies of public transport in Hong Kong. Past 
studies on public transport in Hong Kong were mainly on rail. This 
work is on franchised buses. 
 
The techniques used are Translog regression and 
Cobb-Douglass Production Function.  The data used are 
verifiable official data and statistics that span from 1950 to 2009 
that have been published but have never been used by researchers.  
Methods developed here can surely be applied to other modes of 
transport, such as ferries and railways, as well. 
 
 Compared to the initial and heroic attempt of Yang 2009, the 
analysis performed here is far more precise and sophisticated. A 
more realistic production function is adopted, instead of her linear 
model, which generates much better information for further 
studies. 
 
Besides, this dissertation also makes several attempts to 
interpret transport operations by Coasian concepts and relate them 
to land-use planning, applying the diverse professional knowledge 
which I have learnt in the Department of Real Estate and 
Construction. 
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Conclusion of this dissertation 
This dissertation examines the bus industry in Hong Kong in 
various aspects: 1) Intention for the Government to safeguard 
public interest to transport; and 2) the production structure of 
individual bus companies. 
 
For (1), it is illustrated in various aspects that the franchising 
framework described in Coase (1959) can be justified in regulating 
bus operations of Hong Kong. Also, the aim of the Government to 
provide socially optimal transportation, as described in Coase 
(1946; 1974) was demonstrated through various control 
mechanisms. 
 
For (2), it is shown in the ‘translog’ production model that 
positive economies of scale are displayed in the two largest bus 
companies in Hong Kong. This scale efficiency in resource 
allocation was further boosted with the introduction of competitors. 
However, their involvement in real estate activities in later years 
posed negative impacts to bus operations. Finally, it argues that bus 
operation in Hong Kong is heavily affected by the town planning 
policies of the Government. Nowadays, a tougher operating 
environment was placed over bus companies. 
 
Limitation and grounds for further studies 
As mentioned in Ch.1 of this dissertation, at present, few 
attempts have been made by researchers to investigate the scale 
effects in the Hong Kong bus industry. Although, as stated in Ch.3 
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that translog production equation has been used widely by 
researchers, none has been applied to the case in Hong Kong. 
Therefore, it is believed that the concept and model initiated in this 
dissertation provides an early base for similar studies in Hong 
Kong. Also, the use of a common translog model provides 
favourable result for benchmarking, especially among bus 
companies from other countries. More than that, in the above 
regression model, only a narrow part of ‘Economies of Scale’ is 
studied. Many entries (e.g. factor productivity, cross-substitution of 
inputs) are still unexplored at present. This dissertation could 
therefore provide important data for further researches. 
 
There are, however, some limitations in this dissertation as 
well. To carry out a thorough study of bus transport, it is advisable 
to carry out investigation into the operation of City-bus (CTB) and 
New World First Bus (NWFB). However, these analyses were 
limited by the incomplete operational data disclosed by the 
company. Since both CTB and NWFB were conglomerated as one 
enterprise in 2003, operation statistics of individual companies 
were no longer disclosed. This limited availability of data placed 
barriers for detailed research. 
 
The ever-changing ownership structure of CTB and NWFB in 
recent years creates numerous uncertainties for data interpretation. 
Despite these difficulties, operating data from these two companies 
were still included in Appendix 4 to assist further studies. 
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Appendix 1 - Production functions in transport economics 
Literature Type of model 
used 
Location of 
study 
Scope 
Kumbhakar 
(1990) 
Generalized 
McFadden 
U.S.A. Air 
Baltagi et al 
(1995) 
Hedonic translog Canada Air 
Tolofari et al 
(1990) 
Translog U.K. Air 
Williams (1979) Cobb-Douglas U.S.A. Bus 
Lee and Steedman 
(1970) 
Linear U.K. Bus 
Koshal (1972) Linear U.S.A. Bus 
Wabe & Cole 
(1975) 
Quadratic U.K. Bus 
Filippini and 
Prioni (2003) 
Translog Switzerland Bus 
Berechman (1983) Translog Israel Bus 
Viton (1981) Translog U.S.A. Bus 
Obeng (1985) Translog U.S.A. Bus 
Keeler (1974) Cobb-Douglas U.S.A. Rail 
Pozdena and 
Merewitz (1978) 
Cobb-Douglas U.S.A. Rail 
Hasenkamp 
(1976) 
Constant Elasticity 
of Substitution 
U.S.A. Rail 
De Borger (1992) Generalized 
Box-Ox 
Belgium Rail 
Bitzan and Wilson 
(2007) 
Hedonic translog U.S.A. Rail 
Atack (1978) Linear U.S.A. Sea 
Case and Lave 
(1970) 
Log-linear U.S.A. Sea 
Koenker (1972) 
(Part 1) 
Linear India Truck 
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Appendix 2 – History of ordinances regulating bus companies: 
 
Year of 
enactment 
Name of Ordinance Governing 
1912 The Vehicles and Traffic Regulation 
Ordinance (No. 40) 
CMB, KMB
1957 Road Traffic Ordinance (No. 39) CMB, KMB
1960 Public Transport Service (Hong Kong 
Island) Ordinance (No. 4) 
CMB 
1960 Public Transport Service (Kowloon and 
New Territories) Ordinance (No. 5) 
KMB 
1975 Public Omnibus Services Ordinance 
(No. 59) 
CMB, KMB, 
NLB (since 
1973) 
1984 Public Bus Services Ordinance (Ch. 230) CMB (to 
1998), CTB 
(since 1992), 
KMB, NLB, 
NWFB 
(since 1998), 
LWB (since 
1996) 
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Appendix 3 – Deflator used in the regression model 
 
Year / Period Deflator (2007 = 100) 
1950 6.358  
1951 6.813  
1952 9.084  
1953 9.840  
1954 9.447  
1955 9.014  
1956 9.322  
1957 9.401  
1958 9.178  
1959 9.932  
1960 9.512  
1961 9.200  
1961 9.153 
1962 9.335 
1963 9.687 
1964 10.175 
1965 10.432 
1966 10.493 
1967 11.181 
1968 11.557 
1969 12.203 
1970 13.288 
1971 14.304 
1972 15.623 
1973 17.853 
1974 19.942 
1975 20.872 
1976 22.875 
1977 23.728 
1978 25.623 
1979 30.143 
1980 34.811 
1981 38.384 
1982 42.108 
1983 44.022 
1984 48.270 
1985 50.879 
1986 52.842 
1987 57.442 
1988 62.619 
1989 70.610 
1990 75.904 
1991 82.771 
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(Continued) 
Year / Period Deflator (2007 = 100) 
1992 90.986 
1993 98.901 
1994 105.301 
1995 109.650 
1996 115.965 
1997 122.553 
1998 123.664 
1998 (1Q) 124.558 
1998 (2Q) 122.770 
1999 117.825 
1999 (1Q) 119.442 
1999 (2Q) 116.209 
2000 113.198 
2000 (1Q) 114.489 
2000 (2Q) 111.907 
2001 111.531 
2001 (1Q) 111.970 
2001 (2Q) 111.091 
2002 107.348 
2002 (1Q) 108.979 
2002 (2Q) 105.718 
2003 100.615 
2003 (1Q) 101.692 
2003 (2Q) 99.539 
2004 97.334 
2004 (1Q) 98.061 
2004 (2Q) 96.607 
2005 97.663 
2005 (1Q) 97.696 
2005 (2Q) 97.630 
2006 97.746 
2006 (1Q) 97.354 
2006 (2Q) 98.139 
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(Continued) 
Year / Period Deflator (2007 = 100) 
2007 100.000 
2007 (1Q) 98.977 
2007 (2Q) 102.753 
2008 101.719 
2008 (1Q) 100.896 
2008 (2Q) 102.542 
2009 102.254 
2009 (1Q) 102.029 
2009 (2Q) 102.479 
Remarks: 
- Data for 1950-1960: Official estimation based on retail price index, 
wage index and fuel index (see Ch.4: 47); 
- Data for 1961-2009: GDP deflator 
 
(Source: 1950-1960: General Correspondence Files available at the Public 
Records Office; 
1961-2009: Annual reports of Hong Kong. H.K.: Govt. Printer) 
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Appendix 4 – Operating Statistics of bus companies in Hong Kong 
Kowloon Motor Bus (K.M.B.): 1950 – 2009: 
Year Bus 
Fleet 
No. of 
Routes 
operated 
Operating 
Mileage 
(million km)
Passenger-journey
(millions) 
% of total 
public-transport 
journeys 
1948 152 20 15.53 56.50 - 
1949 191 24 18.11 90 - 
1950 250 25 20.92 123.25 - 
1951 180 27 22.93 168.73 36.70% 
1952 355 29 24.94 177.90 37.43% 
1953 350 31 26.55 189.10 38.03% 
1954 370 34 28.57 203.25 39.36% 
1955 370 34 30.98 223.20 40.37% 
1956 450 38 32.19 244.09 41.04% 
1957 526 39 34.60 270.08 42.17% 
1958 526 41 37.82 291.55 42.68% 
1959 512 41 39.11 322.08 44.53% 
1960 563 45 47.96 381.71 46.92% 
1961 721 56 56.33 435.52 48.79% 
1962 777 59 62.36 481.57 49.30% 
1963 886 61 63.73 515.17 49.79% 
1964 946 63 64.86 548.15 50.04% 
1965 1,004 64 73.50 593.22 50.93% 
1966 1,055 65 75.96 643.12 51.84% 
1967 1,051 65 (49) 52.30 515.54 48.77% 
1968 1,050 65 64.53 610.75 50.93% 
1969 970 67 67.21 611.46 49.76% 
1970 1,018 71 65.02 568.01 48.81% 
1971 1,122 76 65.15 547.57 47.92% 
1972 1,272 84 71.45 501.19 46.83% 
1973 1,324 92 74.19 493.69 48.36% 
1974 1,371 106 88.35 564.49 50.38% 
1975 1,560 149 101.39 634.56 52.16% 
1976 1,700 162 112.65 716.43 55.64% 
1977 1,708 173 117.90 810.93 57.86% 
1978 1,804 196 117.64 860.48 58.34% 
1979 1,867 212 113 934.34 57.64% 
1980 2,089 31 122 911.66 51.71% 
1981 2,390 18 134 933.03 50.38% 
1982 2,369 207 140 940.40 46.91% 
1983 2,380 192 160 981.82 45.09% 
1984 2,441 198 170 1,069.32 45.87% 
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(Continued) 
Year Bus 
Fleet 
No. of 
Routes 
operated 
Operating 
Mileage 
(million km)
Passenger-journey
(millions) 
% of total 
public-transport 
journeys 
1985 2,511 207 188 1,079.05 44.49% 
1986 2,740 235 210 1,108.29 43.94% 
1987 2,900 243 220 1,088.36 31.91% 
1988 2,770 239 216 1,081.83 30.87% 
1989 2,849 251 201 973.89 27.30% 
1990 2,887 286 195 965.86 26.92% 
1991 3,037 282 217 968.08 26.87% 
1992 3,121 305 234 970.65 26.58% 
1993 3,197 347 243 965.85 26.11% 
1994 3,369 355 255 976.67 25.79% 
1995 3,507 357 271 995.10 26.03% 
1996 3,597 357 285 1,031.89 26.36% 
1997 3,839 371 300.19 1,051.10 26.98% 
1998 3,991 387 328.75 1,034.35 26.77% 
1999 4,064 385 343.58 1,060.01 27.21% 
2000 4,238 381 360.32 1,089.18 28.28% 
2001 4,371 387 384.88 1,111.17 28.50% 
2002 4,430 388 349.91 1,134.35 28.57% 
2003 4,284 456 344.30 1,060.51 27.76% 
2004 4,141 450 342.79 1,063.85 26.31% 
2005 4,021 447 338.98 1,009.94 24.77% 
2006 4,013 446 336.22 1,007.87 24.30% 
2007 4,027 444 331.16 1,008.14 23.97% 
2008 3,880 420 325.40 986.49 23.61% 
2009 3,879 396 320.78 965.16 23.31% 
Remarks: 
- Only operational data for franchise bus operation is included 
- Size of the Bus Fleet and Bus Routes are counted at year-end 
- Only the number of licensed franchised buses are counted 
- The above data set does not include operational statistics of the Long 
Win Bus 
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China Motor Bus (C.M.B.): 1950 – 1998: 
Year Bus 
Fleet 
No. of 
Routes 
operated 
Operating 
Mileage 
(million km)
Passenger-journey
(millions) 
% of total 
public-transport 
journeys 
1948 108 10 4.83 20 - 
1949 128 11 7.24 36 - 
1950 144 12 8.53 43.6 - 
1951 151 15 9.82 46.12 10.03% 
1952 170 16 10.94 50.79 10.69% 
1953 172 16 11.75 54.15 10.89% 
1954 188 18 11.93 55.95 10.84% 
1955 193 18 12.55 65.05 11.77% 
1956 200 18 13.04 67.92 11.42% 
1957 221 18 13.52 72.09 11.26% 
1958 239 18 14.81 79.61 11.65% 
1959 249 19 16.09 87.18 12.05% 
1960 300 22 17.70 106.57 13.10% 
1961 307 26 19.31 120.12 13.46% 
1962 325 27 21.77 134.20 13.74% 
1963 360 27 22.85 143.03 13.82% 
1964 394 31 24.62 158.67 14.48% 
1965 459 31 26.72 169.26 14.53% 
1966 498 31 30.09 186.56 15.04% 
1967 502 27 24.62 169.15 16.00% 
1968 483 31 30.09 201.11 16.77% 
1969 487 36 27.97 212.88 17.33% 
1970 499 36 26.07 185.80 15.97% 
1971 483 37 24.62 175.11 15.33% 
1972 496 39 20.86 136.20 12.73% 
1973 565 39 28.32 163.60 16.03% 
1974 595 47 33.96 197.00 17.58% 
1975 629 60 40.39 215.76 17.74% 
1976 702 80 42.16 231.70 17.99% 
1977 751 84 41.52 239.61 17.09% 
1978 820 100 40.88 254.69 17.27% 
1979 848 99 39.59 274.32 16.92% 
1980 985 117 42.65 275.53 15.63% 
1981 1,028 102 44.10 298.20 16.10% 
1982 1,047 107 49.25 328.50 16.39% 
1983 1,090 95 53.91 357.60 16.42% 
1984 1,076 104 55.30 363.50 15.59% 
1985 1,054 100 54.90 344.03 14.19% 
1986 1,019 115 55.60 318.40 12.62% 
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(Continued) 
Year Bus 
Fleet 
No. of 
Routes 
operated 
Operating 
Mileage 
(million km)
Passenger-journey
(millions) 
% of total 
public-transport 
journeys 
1987 925 116 54.60 318.40 9.34% 
1988 1,008 99 51.00 317.61 9.06% 
1989 1,006 105 50.40 298.81 8.38% 
1990 1,026 109 52.30 280.88 7.83% 
1991 1,020 122 52.20 267.15 7.42% 
1992 1,027 130 51.30 262.43 7.19% 
1993 1,014 129 45.00 235.67 6.37% 
1994 961 131 44.30 196.80 5.20% 
1995 883 87 44.00 190.97 4.99% 
1996 853 85 45.50 179.21 4.58% 
1997 823 115 46.25 176.45 4.53% 
19981 746 126 30.30 104.92 2.71% 
Remarks: 
- Size of the Bus Fleet and Bus Routes are counted at year-end 
- Only the number of licensed franchised buses are counted 
- Franchise bus operation of CMB was terminated on 30th August 1998 
                                                 
1 Data is recorded up to 30th August, 1998 
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Citybus (C.T.B.): 1991 – 2009: 
Year Bus 
Fleet 
No. of 
Routes 
operated 
Operating 
Mileage 
(million km)
Passenger-journey
(millions) 
% of total 
public-transport 
journeys 
1991 9 1 - 0.18 0.01% 
1992 9 1 - 0.96 0.03% 
1993 200 26 3.60 22.20 0.60% 
1994 144 39 12.00 67.70 1.79% 
1995 338 55 17.11 87.50 2.29% 
1996 407 58 25.00 119.69 3.06% 
1997 590 84 36.83 147.75 3.79% 
1998 955 107 64.58 183.30 4.74% 
1999 959 107 83.65 203.01 5.38% 
2000 960 107 82.59 213.31 5.54% 
2001 957 110 82.05 216.48 5.55% 
2002 956 112 83.72 220.38 5.55% 
2003 940 113 82.83 207.34 5.43% 
2004 911 112 84.20 210.80 5.21% 
2005 910 112 82.30 205.08 5.03% 
2006 909 111 82.36 207.76 5.01% 
2007 919 112 82.58 210.45 5.00% 
2008 925 110 82.67 209.10 5.00% 
2009 931 110 82.01 206.61 4.99% 
Remarks: 
- Only operations of the franchise bus division is included 
- Size of the Bus Fleet and Bus Routes are counted at year-end 
- Only the number of licensed franchised buses are counted 
- The data set include franchise bus operations on the North-Lantau 
Island (Franchise 2) 
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New World First Bus (N.W.F.B.): 1998 – 2009: 
Year Bus 
Fleet 
No. of 
Routes 
operated 
Operating 
Mileage 
(million km)
Passenger-journey
(millions) 
% of total 
public-transport 
journeys 
1998 841 93 13.84 46.96 1.22% 
1999 703 93 50.38 160.37 4.25% 
2000 730 94 55.48 186.52 4.84% 
2001 757 97 56.69 194.49 4.99% 
2002 769 99 60.94 195.45 4.92% 
2003 730 102 59.41 180.54 4.73% 
2004 695 98 56.43 184.63 4.57% 
2005 694 95 52.07 177.48 4.35% 
2006 694 94 50.92 183.08 4.41% 
2007 694 94 50.39 184.38 4.38% 
2008 713 91 49.40 175.47 4.20% 
2009 705 91 48.78 171.89 4.15% 
Remarks: 
- NWFB started its operation on 1 September 1998 
- Size of the Bus Fleet and Bus Routes are counted at year-end 
- Only the number of licensed franchised buses are counted 
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New Lantao Bus (N.L.B.): 1973 – 2009: 
Year Bus 
Fleet 
No. of 
Routes 
operated 
Operating 
Mileage 
(million km)
Passenger-journey
(millions) 
% of total 
public-transport 
journeys 
1973 41 - - 1.75 0.17% 
1974 42 - - 1.23 0.11% 
1975 42 5 1.17  1.37 0.11% 
1976 44 5 1.41  1.53 0.12% 
1977 45 5 - 2.01 0.14% 
1978 53 5 - 2.20 0.15% 
1979 58 6 - 2.48 0.15% 
1980 56 6 - 2.80 0.16% 
1981 59 6 - 3.13 0.17% 
1982 61 6 - 3.38 0.17% 
1983 58 8 - 3.17 0.15% 
1984 57 8 - 3.17 0.14% 
1985 58 10 - 3.19 0.13% 
1986 56 8 - 3.03 0.12% 
1987 55 8 - 3.23 0.09% 
1988 60 9 - 3.44 0.10% 
1989 56 9 - 3.88 0.11% 
1990 59 8 - 4.23 0.12% 
1991 65 9 - 4.29 0.12% 
1992 76 7 - 3.99 0.11% 
1993 56 7 - 4.11 0.11% 
1994 74 8 - 6.50 0.17% 
1995 69 8 - 5.38 0.14% 
1996 69 9 2.75  5.27 0.13% 
1997 80 13 3.64  5.92 0.15% 
1998 87 20 4.75  6.21 0.16% 
1999 86 23 5.10  5.45 0.14% 
2000 84 22 4.99  5.51 0.14% 
2001 79 23 4.86  6.83 0.18% 
2002 78 25 4.99  8.96 0.23% 
2003 80 25 5.08  9.68 0.25% 
2004 86 24 5.40  12.06 0.30% 
2005 86 23 5.32  13.35 0.33% 
2006 83 22 5.08  14.05 0.34% 
2007 94 23 5.51  16.15 0.38% 
2008 102 22 5.76  17.19 0.41% 
2009 104 24 6.10  18.04 0.44% 
Remarks: 
- NLB was granted a franchise since 1st April 1974 
- Size of the Bus Fleet and Bus Routes are counted at year-end 
- Only the number of licensed franchised buses are counted 
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Long Win Bus (L.W.B.): 1998 – 2009: 
Year Bus 
Fleet 
No. of 
Routes 
operated 
Operating 
Mileage 
(million km)
Passenger-journey
(millions) 
% of total 
public-transport 
journeys 
1997 22 11 1.43 2.88 0.07% 
1998 160 14 16.04 14.36 0.37% 
1999 159 15 24.87 16.90 0.45% 
2000 159 15 22.56 17.25 0.45% 
2001 160 15 22.77 19.00 0.49% 
2002 145 15 23.14 20.31 0.51% 
2003 145 15 22.65 19.26 0.50% 
2004 144 15 23.46 22.31 0.55% 
2005 146 18 23.79 24.29 0.60% 
2006 153 18 24.46 26.51 0.64% 
2007 159 18 24.94 27.67 0.66% 
2008 157 18 25.60 28.87 0.69% 
2009 167 19 25.78 28.16 0.68% 
Remarks: 
- Long Win Bus commenced its operation in May 1997 
- Size of the Bus Fleet and Bus Routes are counted at year-end 
- Only the number of licensed franchised buses are counted 
 
                                                 
1 Only the route E31 is operated by LWB at the end of 1997 
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Appendix 5 - Route map of the MTR in Hong Kong 
Route map of the initial MTR system by the end of 1979: 
 
(Source: P.16, The Asia Magazine, 10 January 1980) 
 
Remarks: 
- ‘Modified Initial System’ was the name of the early network of  
MTR system when it commenced its services on 30 September 1979. 
- Shek Kip Mei to Kwun Tong:  Commenced on 1 October 1979. 
Tsimshatsui to Shek Kip Mei:  Commenced on 16 December 1979. 
Chater to Tsimshatsui:        Commenced on 12 February 1980. 
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Route map of the MTR system in 2010: 
 
(Source: Website of the Mass Transit Railway Corporation, 
http://www.mtr.com.hk) 
 
Remarks: 
- Kowloon Canton Railway Corporation (KCRC) was merged with 
MTRC on 2 December 2007. 
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